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A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a distributed network that facilitates wireless 
information gathering within a region of interest. For this reason, WSNs are relied upon 
by the Department of Defense for deployment in remote and hostile areas.  The 
information collected by sensors is aggregated at a central point known as a sink node. 
Two challenges in the deployment of WSNs are limited battery power of each sensor 
node and sink node privacy/anonymity. The role played by the sink node raises its profile 
as a high value target for attack, thus its anonymity is crucial to the security of a WSN.  
In order to improve network security, we must implement a protocol that conceals the 
sink node’s location while being cognizant of energy resource constraints. In this thesis, 
we develop a routing algorithm based on node clustering to improve sink node anonymity 
while simultaneously limiting node energy depletion.  Via MATLAB simulations, we 
analyze the effectiveness of this algorithm in obfuscating the sink node’s location in the 
WSN while preserving node energy.  We show that the anonymity of the sink node is 
independent of traffic volume and that the average energy consumed by a node remains 
consistent across topological variations.  
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Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are ad-hoc networks in which sensor nodes are widely 
distributed in a region of interest for data extraction in real time. A sensor observes an 
event or gathers some physical data from its area of interest. It then processes the 
observed or gathered data using a tiny embedded processor. The sensor sends the 
processed data to a central data collector. The sensor nodes act as both sensing and 
routing devices. Multiple sensor nodes may be used to transmit data from the initial 
source node to the destination (i.e., multi-hop communication). The destination node in a 
WSN is characterized as the sink node.   
When a WSN is deployed, each sensor has a finite amount of energy. Each action 
(i.e., sensing, transmitting etc.) that is taken by a sensor has an energy cost that slowly 
depletes the sensor’s power. The death of a single node does not have a major impact on 
the WSN, but as additional nodes die out, the performance of the WSN is degraded. 
WSNs greatly extend our ability to monitor and control the physical environment 
from remote locations and improve the accuracy of information obtained via 
collaboration among sensor nodes and online information processing at these nodes [1]. 
For this reason, WSNs are currently used for a broad range of military, civilian, and 
commercial applications.  
WSN security is especially important from the DOD perspective; failure to 
protect the network can completely subvert the intended purpose of the sensor network 
[2].  These networks are remotely deployed and are vulnerable to malicious infiltration. It 
can no longer be assumed that an adversary has to be technologically advanced to 
observe or interfere with a deployed WSN. Due to the shared nature of wireless 
communication media, an attacker can easily eavesdrop on the radio communications 
either by purchasing their own sensor devices or by leveraging other radio devices 
capable of monitoring message transmission. The information that is revealed is 
meaningful-where the communication occurred and who participated in the 
communication.  
 xx 
The sink node in a WSN is crucial for gathering, aggregating, and transferring 
sensor information. Specific to DOD applications, the sink node is relied upon to provide 
critical information to personnel on the ground about an area of interest. The role played 
by the sink node in the WSN raises its profile as a high value target for attack. Since the 
sink node is a central point of failure, an adversary can destroy the sink and render 
ineffective the data gathering duties of the entire sensor network.  
The privacy of the sink’s location is a unique problem in WSNs.  The protection 
of the sink’s location cannot be achieved using existing security mechanisms, such as 
packet encryption, key management, etc. Therefore, it is important to develop and 
implement specific protocols that conceal the sink node’s location. At the same time, a 
scheme for sink protection should not affect normal sensing and communication tasks 
that require knowledge of the sink’s location. In most cases, sensed data is transmitted 
along paths from source nodes to a sink node. This produces pronounced traffic patterns 
that reveal the direction and, thus, the location of the sink node. An adversary can analyze 
the traffic patterns to deduce the location of the sink.  
Another important parameter in achieving sink node anonymity/privacy is the 
issue of node energy maintenance. Any anonymity scheme that is implemented in a WSN 
must ensure that the energy of the nodes in not significantly depleted. Thus, a balance 
must be achieved in which sink node anonymity is attained while keeping node energy 
levels sufficient enough to continue network operations.  
To address the issue of sink node privacy/anonymity, we develop a strategy to 
obfuscate the sink node’s location using a hierarchical routing mechanism, known as 
clustering, while simultaneously limiting node energy depletion. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first work that develops a novel sink node anonymity algorithm in 
a resource efficient manner. The contributions of this thesis can be summarized as 
follows: 
 Development and implementation of a network topology and clustering 
algorithm in a resource-efficient manner.  
 Development of a routing algorithm for sink node anonymity. 
 xxi 
 Simulation and evaluation of the routing algorithm for security robustness 
and energy preservation.  
When the WSN is deployed the nodes are randomly distributed throughout the 
entire area of interest. The network model which is used in this thesis is a square 100 
meter by 100 meter area. There are 100 nodes in the model. From a global view of the 
sensor area, the placements do not follow any pattern and, thus, can be modeled by a 
random distribution. The sink node is deliberately placed at the location (x,y)=(25 meters, 
75 meters). The location of the sink node is deliberate because the personnel responsible 
for deploying the WSN deliberately place the sink node, likely co-locating it with their 
observation post.  
Once the WSN deployed, the first step in our proposed algorithm is the 
initialization and formation of clusters. All of the nodes in the WSN either elect to 
become a Cluster Head (CH) or join a cluster as a cluster member, with the exception of 
the sink node. The sink node is always a cluster member in the WSN; it is never elected 
to be a CH. Each sensor in the WSN may elect to become a CH with a fixed probability p 
when the network is deployed. An iterative approach is utilized to balance the competing 
demands of preventing isolation and achieving energy efficiency. In this thesis the 
probability of a sensor node electing to become a CH p is fixed at 0.20. We choose three 
iterations to elect the CHs. At the end of the final iteration of CH election, all nodes in the 
WSN are either CHs or cluster members.  
Let N be the set of all nodes in the WSN and let i denote the total number of 
nodes. In this thesis i=100 nodes. Now 
 1 2{ , ,..... }iN n n n . (1) 
CH is the set of nodes which serve as CHs. The total number of CHs is denoted as j: 
 
1 2{ch ,ch ,.....ch }jCH  . (2) 
CM is the set of nodes which serve as cluster members. The total number of cluster 
members is denoted as k: 
 1 2{cm ,cm ,.....cm }kCM  . (3) 
Each in  in N becomes an element of CH or CM: 
 xxii 
 i b
n ch CH 
or i b
n cm CM 
. (4) 
The goal of developing this algorithm is to ensure that at least n other nodes in the 
WSN have similar traffic statistics as the sink node.  
 Clustering also imposes a substantial energy burden on the nodes that act as 
CHs, therefore, we rotate the CHs. The CHs are rotated when one of two conditions are 
met. Either one of the CHs has expended a certain amount of energy or a specific number 
of messages have been transmitted through the WSN. Implementing CH rotation allows 
us to distribute the burden of being the CH across the WSN while increasing the overall 
lifetime of the WSN.  
The CHs in the WSN are responsible for routing data from the source node’s CH 
to the sink node’s CH. When forwarding data to the next node, each CH has two options. 
The message can be directly forwarded to the next node or widely broadcast to all sensors 
within range. In this algorithm we choose a subset of CHs to broadcast. The sink node’s 
CH always broadcasts the messages it receives so that the sink node can receive the 
information. The total number of broadcast CHs (denoted as BCCH in Eq. 5) is denoted 
as m: 
 1 2{bc ,bc ,.....bc }mBCCH   and BBCH CH . (5)  
By broadcasting traffic to nodes other than the sink, we are essentially creating a 
situation where additional nodes resemble the sink in terms of traffic volume. In this 
thesis we determine that we would like a lower threshold of at least 20 nodes to have 
similar traffic statistics. In other words, from the adversary’s perspective, there are 
multiple nodes acting like sink nodes. The number of nodes broadcast to directly 
correlates to the anonymity of the sink node. Once the threshold of 20 nodes is exceeded, 
no additional broadcast CHs are selected. 
To choose the broadcast CH, the CHs are ordered by their residual energy levels:  
 
5 8{ch ,ch ,.....ch }energy jCH  . (6) 
Each broadcast CH is selected in order of maximum energy remaining: 1 5bc ch , 
2 8bc ch and so on. A broadcast CH broadcasts any data it receives to all of its cluster 
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members in addition to the next hop CH. The total number of nodes broadcast to is 









 . (7) 
The anonymity factor of the sink node is denoted as AF and is defined to be:  
 logy
1/ ( )topoAF average  .  (8) 
Once broadcast CHs are determined, we determine the paths that traffic takes to 
reach the sink node’s CH. To establish routing paths, each CH uses Dijkstra’s routing 
algorithm to determine the path to the sink node’s CH. Dijkstra’s algorithm is a well-
known, simple, least-cost algorithm that finds the lowest cost path from a source to a 
destination [3].  We used Euclidian distance as the cost between two CHs in Dijkstra’s 
algorithm. The resulting path is the most energy efficient route through the WSN without 
factoring in the additional cost of the broadcast CHs.  
The algorithmic process discussed above is shown in Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4.  
 
Figure 1.  The WSN is deployed. All of the sensor nodes are placed 




Figure 2.  The WSN forms clusters with the election of CHs.  
 
Figure 3.  A subset of the CHs become broadcast CHs.  
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Figure 4.  All cluster heads utilize Dijkstra’s algorithm to determine the 
least cost route to the sink node’s CH. Traffic is routing using the 
results of Dijkstra’s algorithm. Broadcast CHs broadcast the data to all 
their cluster members. 
In our simulations we generated four different topologies. Each topology 
represents a different physical location of the nodes in the WSN. We generated traffic to 
be routed across the WSN at four different traffic volumes: 5,000 messages, 10,000 
messages, 15,000 messages and 20,000 messages. We conducted five trials at each traffic 
volume on each topology.  For simplicity, we did not let any nodes die out in these 
simulations because when nodes die the WSN may become partitioned, making the 
problem more difficult. Our goal is to evaluate the performance of the algorithm over a 
network where all of the nodes are alive.   
To evaluate the anonymity factor, we take the average value of the cluster 
members broadcast to across the simulation.  From our simulations we were able to 
evaluate the resource efficiency and resulting sink node anonymity level of our proposed 
algorithm.  
Considering all four topologies individually and averaged together, we find 
remarkably consistent results for the average amount of energy consumed by a node in 
the WSN, as shown in Figure 2. The average energy consumed by a node increases as the 
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traffic volume increases for each topology. Comparing the results side by side on the 
same plot, we see that the average energy consumed by a node in Topology 1 is 
consistently less than the other topologies. We expect this variation among the topologies 
as the physical location of the nodes affects the energy consumption of each node in the 
WSN. These results are promising because the average energy use by each node is an 
effective parameter for planning overall network lifetime.  
 
 
Figure 5. The average energy consumed by a node for all four 
topologies and the average of the four. The average energy consumed 
by a node in the WSN increases as the traffic volume through the WSN 
increases from 5,000 messages to 20,000 messages. The results are 
consistent across the four topologies simulated.  
From Figure 3, it can be seen that the maximum energy consumed for all four 
topologies and their average. We can see that the maximum energy consumed by a node 
for each topology and traffic volume varies more than the average energy consumed. 
From Figure 3, we see that the maximum energy consumed by a node of the different 
topologies is not tightly grouped at any of the traffic volumes.  We attribute the 
maximum energy consumed variations to many roles played by the node (i.e., cluster 
member, CH, and broadcast CH). Each of these roles contributes to the energy 
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consumption of the node, and because each of these roles is randomized, the MaxEC is 
highly variable. 
 
Figure 6. The maximum energy values for all four topologies and their 
average. The maximum energy consumed by a node in the WSN 
increases as the traffic volume through the WSN increase from 5,000 
messages to 20,000 messages. Topology 1 consistently consumes less 
energy than Topologies 2, 3 and 4 but follows the same general trend of 
increased consumption with increased traffic volume.   
By taking the average of the five trials at each traffic volume for each topology, 
we see that the outliers are eliminated and that the average number of nodes broadcast to 
falls between 25.6724 and 28.7712 for all of the topologies. For the traffic volume of 
5,000 messages, the average number of nodes broadcast to and the anonymity factor is 
tightly grouped. At the traffic volume of 10,000 messages, the highest and lowest number 
average number of nodes broadcast to are both present. At 15,000 and 20,000 messages, 
the range that the average values are spread over decreases again. These results are 
shown in Table 1.  
The results vary based on traffic volume and do not demonstrate any trends of 
convergence to a number of nodes broadcast to or divergence from a number of nodes 
broadcast to as traffic volume increases.  Just as there are no trends in the average 
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number of nodes broadcast to, there are no trends on the anonymity factor over the 
different traffic volumes. The anonymity factor is independent of the overall traffic 
volume is shown in Figure 4. This is an important conclusion because if the anonymity 
factor was reliant on a certain traffic volume this would be a constraint for the 
employment of the algorithm and our objective is for this to have broad applications. 
Table 1.  The results of the anonymity metrics is the average number 
of nodes broadcast to. This is used to determine the anonymity factor of 
the topologies. 
 
Topology 1 Topology 2 Topology 3 Topology 4
Average Number of Total Number of Nodes Broadcast to by algorithm
5000 Messages 26.863320 26.743820 27.153320 27.100000
10000 Messages 25.672740 28.771200 27.981800 28.036360
15000 Messages 26.694700 28.320580 26.387500 27.237500
20000 Messages 26.542860 28.451060 27.509640 28.314320
Topology 26.443405 28.071665 27.258065 27.672045
Anonymity Factor
5000 Messages 0.037225 0.037392 0.036828 0.036900
10000 Messages 0.038952 0.034757 0.035738 0.035668
15000 Messages 0.037461 0.035310 0.037897 0.036714
20000 Messages 0.037675 0.035148 0.036351 0.035318
Topology 0.037817 0.035623 0.036686 0.036138
Average Anonymity Factor Across All Topologies 0.036566
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Figure 7.  The anonymity factor of each topology and the average 
anonymity factor calculated at each traffic volume. 
This conclusion leads us to examine the average number of nodes broadcast to at 
all message volumes, listed in Table 1, to determine the anonymity factor for the 
topology. We see very consistent results across the four topologies, as illustrated in 
Figure 5 and Figure 6. We see variation between the four topologies, just as we did in the 
energy efficiency conclusions. However, we also see that the results are remarkably 
consistent. The value of the anonymity factor for each topology is under 0.04. This means 
that for any given topology we simulated, an adversary conducting traffic analysis of the 
deployed WSN has a less than 4% chance of finding the sink node on his/her first guess 
when physically searching for the sensor. 
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Figure 8.  The average number of nodes broadcast to for each topology, 
with all traffic volumes included. After concluding that the anonymity 
is independent of traffic volume, we consider all of the data points for 
number of nodes broadcast to for each topology to determine the 
average. 
 
Figure 9. The anonymity factor for all four topologies. The anonymity 
factor of the topologies is calculated based on the average number of 
nodes broadcast to across all traffic volumes. The results are consistent 
across the topologies. 
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WSNs can be used for a variety of military, civilian and commercial applications. 
This thesis was motived by the proliferation of WSNs for military applications. The 
existing research focused on energy conservation without concern for WSN privacy or 
WSN privacy without concern for the limited resources of a WSN. The research in both 
areas failed to address realistic topologies for real world applications. We believe that 
bringing together the notion of energy efficiency and sink node privacy is vital to military 
applications of WSNs. The foundation to simultaneously achieve both objectives is 
provided by the results of this thesis.  
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In 1997, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) adopted the 
first wireless local area network standard, named IEEE 802.11 [1]. The practical 
advantages of being able to move away from a wired architecture have driven staggering 
growth in the development of consumer and commercial devices that are able to connect 
wirelessly. Substantial improvements in integrated chips have also contributed to the 
miniaturization of devices, an increase in processing power resident in a device, and a 
rather dramatic reduction in cost per device.  
Due to these technological advances, the manufacturing of small and low cost 
sensors has become technically and economically feasible [2]. A sensor observes an 
event or gathers some physical data from its area of interest. It then processes the 
observed or gathered data using a tiny embedded processor. The sensor sends the 
processed data to a central data collector either through direct wireless transmission or 
through intermediate nodes [3]. A basic sensor is composed of four subsystems: power, 
sensing, processing, and communications. The interaction of these four subsystems is 
illustrated in Figure 1. The power subsystem is a small battery with finite power capacity 
that is responsible for supporting the functions of all of the other subsystems. The 
capabilities of the sensing subsystem are very broad and can be tailored for desired 
applications. The sensing subsystem can be employed to gather meteorological variables 
such as temperature or pressure or for military use in surveillance missions to detect 
moving targets [3]. A small processor in the sensor comprises the processing subsystem. 
The processor is responsible for preparing sensed data for transmission. The 
communication subsystem is a Radio Frequency (RF) transceiver which is responsible for 
transmitting data from the sensor and receiving information from other sensors in the 
WSN. The Sensors may have additional optional subsystems, such as Global Positioning 
Systems (GPS) or mobilizers [2].  
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Figure 1.  The basic architecture of a sensor consists of four subsystems 
including power, sensing, processing and communication 
subsystems, from [4]. 
A. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS: BACKGROUND 
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is typically composed of a set of sensors that 
probe their physical environment for information and report their measurements to a 
nearby central controller. The controller aggregates all of the sensor node’s information 
and interfaces the WSN to remote users who use the information to plan specific actions 
[5]. WSNs are ad-hoc networks in which sensor nodes are widely distributed in a region 
of interest for data extraction in real time. The sensor nodes act as both sensing and 
routing devices. Multiple sensor nodes may be used to transmit data from the initial 
source node to the destination (i.e., multi-hop communication). The destination node in a 
WSN is characterized as a sink node. A representative WSN topology for military 
applications is illustrated in Figure 2. 
When a WSN is deployed, each sensor has a finite amount of energy. Sensors are 
powered by the power subsystem, and every action that is taken by a sensor has an 
energy cost that slowly depletes the sensor’s power. Some actions like communication 
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require a large amount of power, while other actions like processing and sensing data 
require a very small amount of power. When a sensor loses power, it is no longer able to 
sense information, communicate with other nodes or route information. The death of a 
single node does not have a major impact on the WSN, but as additional nodes die out, 
the performance of the WSN is degraded as the network may become partitioned and is 
no longer reliable. The tradeoff associated with small and inexpensive devices is that the 
network itself is resource constrained and has a limited lifetime.  
 
Figure 2.  The basic topology of a WSN where sensor nodes are deployed to 
track the movement of personnel within an area of interest and report 
the sensed information back to the sink node, after [6]. 
B. WSN APPLICABILITY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
WSNs greatly extend our ability to monitor and control the physical environment 
from remote locations and improve the accuracy of information obtained via 
collaboration among sensor nodes and online information processing at these nodes [1]. 
For this reason, WSNs are currently used for a broad range of military, civilian, and 
commercial applications. Remote sensors provide a means to economically conduct 
continuous surveillance of vast areas, contributing key information to the intelligence 
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collection effort. The Department of Defense (DOD) is able to make use of sensor 
technology to minimize risk to personnel during military operations and reduce the 
number of personnel required. Sensors can be placed just beyond the perimeter of a base, 
on and along the avenues of approach to provide early warning of incoming personnel 
and enhance perimeter security. In a disaster management setup, a large number of 
sensors can be dropped from the air and networked to assist in rescue operations and 
provide situational awareness [7].  
WSN security is especially important from the DOD perspective. Remote Sensor 
Operations have long been a part of military operations. The Marine Corps began using 
sensor networks in 1967 during the Vietnam War [8]. These networks are a vital part of 
the United States Marine Corps (USMC) intelligence gathering efforts and expand the 
commander’s view of the battlefield. Operational needs drive the intelligence gathering 
objectives. A WSN is deployed because additional intelligence is necessary to support the 
execution of an operational objective. The information collected by sensor nodes is 
distributed among small unit leaders for the planning and execution of tactical operations 
[8].  
An important aspect of WSN security is the ability to protect the sink node.  The 
sink node in a WSN is crucial for gathering, aggregating, and transferring sensor 
information. From the perspective of military applications, when sensors gather 
information, the central controller to which this data is sent is the sink node. Thus, the 
sink node is relied upon to provide critical information to personnel on the ground about 
an area of interest. Since the sink node is a central point of failure, an adversary can 
destroy the sink and render ineffective the data gathering duties of the entire sensor 
network. Thus, failure to protect the network completely subverts the intended purpose of 
sensor network applications [9]; therefore, it is important to implement specific protocols 
that conceal the sink node’s location. 
C. RESEARCH MOTIVATIONS AND OBJECTIVE 
Our study into WSNs is from a security perspective in that, because these 
networks are remotely deployed, they are vulnerable to malicious infiltration. The 
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growing capabilities of WSNs and any potential adversary require some modification of 
the tactics, techniques and procedures used for the tactical employment of WSNs. It can 
no longer be assumed that an adversary has to be technologically advanced to observe or 
interfere with a deployed WSN. Due to the shared nature of wireless communication 
media, an attacker can easily eavesdrop on the radio communications either by 
purchasing their own sensor devices or by leveraging other radio devices capable of 
monitoring message transmission. Thus, no matter whether messages are encrypted or 
not, an adversary is able to identify contextual information [10]. While all traffic in a 
military wireless sensor network is encrypted, the contextual information that is revealed 
is meaningful-where the communication occurred and who participated in the 
communication. The role played by the sink node in the sensor network raises its profile 
as a high value target for attack; thus, sink node anonymity is crucial to the security of a 
wireless sensor network deployed for tactical use.   
The privacy of the sink’s location in a unique problem in WSNs. Most security 
and privacy research related to WSNs focuses on secure routing, key management, source 
privacy and denial of service. Nevertheless, the protection of the sink’s location cannot 
be achieved using existing security mechanisms such as packet encryption, key 
management, etc. At the same time, a scheme for sink protection should not affect normal 
sensing and communication tasks that require knowledge of the sink’s location. In most 
cases, sensed data is transmitted along paths from source nodes to a sink node. This 
produces pronounced traffic patterns that reveal the direction and, thus, the location of 
the sink node. An adversary can analyze the traffic patterns to deduce the location of the 
sink.  
Due to the fact that traffic analysis is an effective mechanism to determine the 
geographic location of a sink, research concerning sink location privacy in a sensor 
network has attracted a lot of attention. By hiding the sink node’s true location, the cost 
to the adversary to locate the sink node increases.  
Another important parameter in achieving sink node anonymity/privacy is the 
issue of node energy maintenance. Any anonymity scheme that is implemented in a WSN 
must ensure that the energy of the nodes in not significantly depleted; thus, a balance 
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must be achieved in which sink node anonymity is attained while keeping node energy 
levels sufficient enough to continue network operations.  
D. THESIS CONTRIBUTIONS 
To address the issue of sink node privacy/anonymity, we develop a strategy to 
obfuscate the sink node’s location using a hierarchical routing mechanism known as 
clustering while simultaneously limiting node energy depletion. To the best of our 
knowledge this is the first work that develops a novel sink node anonymity algorithm in a 
resource efficient manner. The contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows: 
 Development and implementation of a network topology and clustering 
algorithm in a resource-efficient manner.  
 Development of a routing algorithm for sink node anonymity. 
 Simulation and evaluation of the routing algorithm for security robustness 
and energy preservation.  
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. The current approaches to 
addressing the privacy and security of WSNs are outlined in Chapter II. The energy 
conservation schemes in WSNs are introduced in Chapter III. The basis of the 
experimental setup, the network model and threat model is explained in Chapter IV. The 
rationale behind the modeling decisions for the network parameters are also addressed in 
Chapter IV. The implementation of the clustering and anonymity routing algorithms 
using the network model developed in Chapter IV is discussed in Chapter V. The 
anonymity routing algorithm is simulated and evaluated in Chapter VI. The thesis is 
concluded and topics are proposed for future work in Chapter VII. All code for the 
algorithms implemented in this thesis is provided in the Appendix.  
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter we provide an introduction and overview of WSNs and their 
applicability to the DOD. The research motivations and objectives were discussed, 
followed by an outline of the thesis contributions.  
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II. PRIVACY IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
To defend and protect a WSN, it is necessary to understand the layering 
architecture of a network. A high degree of cooperation and coordination is needed for 
successful interactions between sensors. These interactions are complex and must be 
broken down into subtasks which are implemented separately [11]. The layering 
architecture of a network facilitates the implementation of these subtasks. The most 
common network layering model is based on the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI). 
The general network layering construct based off of the OSI model is shown in Figure 3. 
The architecture that defines the network functionality is split into layers that collectively 
form the protocol stack of the network [12]. Each layer in the stack performs a related 
subset of the functions required to communicate with another system. This protocol stack 
combines power and routing awareness, integrates data with networking protocols, 
communicates power efficiently through the wireless medium, and promotes cooperative 
efforts between sensor nodes [13]. Given this layered network architecture, we can 
analyze security issues at each layer and determine how security policies can be 
implemented at each layer. 
 
Figure 3.  The five layers of the network on the OSI model, from [12].  
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The physical layer is responsible for frequency selection, carrier frequency 
generation, signal detection, modulation, and data encryption [13]. The most 
straightforward way to protect sensors is at the physical layer. Jamming and tampering 
are the major types of physical attacks. The standard defense against jamming involves 
various forms of frequency hopping communication which requires more complexity 
than low- power, low- cost sensors are able to employ. An attacker can tamper with 
nodes physically and interrogate or compromise them [14]. Passive tamper protection 
mechanisms including protective coating and tamper seals are common in sensors 
because they do not require additional circuitry or energy. While intrusion detection is an 
excellent first line of defense if the sensor is located, the basic functions are well known, 
and the implementation is left to commercial sensor manufacturers.  
The data link layer is responsible for the multiplexing of data streams, data frame 
detection, medium access control (MAC) and error control. It ensures reliable point-to-
point and point-to-multipoint connections in a communication network. The MAC 
protocol establishes communication links for data transfer [13]. The attacks at the data 
link layer compromise the availability of the WSN and deplete the battery of the nodes 
[14].  
The transport layer provides end-to-end communication reliability for data 
exchanged by sensor nodes [13].  This layer is especially needed when the system will be 
accessed through the Internet or some other external network, as is the case for the sink 
node.  The attacks that can threaten the security of the WSN at the transport layer are 
flooding and desynchronization attacks [14]. 
The application layer provides services for an application programs to 
communicate with the stack. For example, internet browsing uses an application protocol 
known as the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) to connect to the internet browser (the 
application) to the layering stack for the internet browsing experience.  
There is abundant literature on privacy at the network layer. Privacy strategies 
implemented at the network layer require specific multi-hop routing protocols to be 
developed. These protocols are used to deliver data from a sensor node to the sink node 
 9 
while ensuring that privacy is protected [14]. There are a number of creative approaches 
to preserve WSN privacy at the network layer. They can be divided into two types: 
source-location privacy and sink- location privacy approaches [10].  
A. SOURCE NODE APPROACHES 
The source node is the node where environmental sensing occurs. Failure to 
protect the source node’s privacy can be detrimental for a number of reasons. As stated 
above, sensors are vulnerable at every level of the network protocol stack. If the security 
of a source node is compromised, it is open to detection, intrusion and interference. The 
military relies on WSN applications for intelligence collections [8]. If the privacy of the 
source node is compromised, then the adversary is able to locate and destroy a source 
node. Even without destroying the node, the adversary can undermine the WSN by 
shaping the traffic at the sensor node either by inflating the traffic volume or by 
deliberating bypassing the node. Data collection by sensors is a vital function of the 
network, and the compromise of a source node can subvert the utility of the WSN.  
1. Periodic Collection 
The simplest approach to protecting the source node is to require each source 
node in the network to transmit on a regular interval. The information transmitted can be 
sensed information or a dummy packet if the sensor has no information to relay at that 
time. An adversary observing the network will be unable to detect the location of the 
source node because the traffic patterns of the WSN are independent of the presence of 
real objects being sensed [9]. 
There are a number of limitations to this. Periodic collection can only be applied 
to applications that require data collection at a low rate and do not have a strict 
requirement for data delivery latency. This means that it is not practical for time sensitive 
WSNs. If the period of periodic collection is short, there is less latency in reporting real-
time data. To implement short periodic collection times requires dummy traffic to be 
generated for each sensor which did not sense a real event during that period. The shorter 
the period, the more dummy traffic needs to be injected, shortening the network lifetime 
[9]. 
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2. Source Simulation 
In source simulation, a set of virtual objects are simulated within the WSN. The 
virtual object is similar to what would be sensed in a real event but is preloaded in a 
token, as the event does not physically occur. Each of the virtual objects generates a 
traffic pattern similar to that of a real object. Before the WSN is deployed, a subset of the 
sensors is pre-loaded with a token for the virtual object. Once deployed this token emits a 
signal used by real objects for event detection. This triggers the event detection process in 
the local area and generates traffic as if a real event is detected [15]. The generated traffic 
creates multiple viable traffic paths in comparison to the real traffic path, thereby 
obfuscating the source node. In Figure 4, one sensor node detects a real event, and the 
other sensor nodes with a token generate traffic that looks like a real event. 
 
Figure 4.  Virtual objects are simulated in the WSN. One path represents the 
movement of a soldier in the WSN as he passes sensor nodes; the 
other three paths are simulated alternates, after [15]. 
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Source simulation applications are limited to mobile objects. The paths in Figure 
4 represent a mobile object entering the sensing range of a number of sensors as it travels. 
Each sensor reports data back to the sink node. For example, the movement of a soldier 
on the battlefield can be picked up by multiple sensors as he conducts a patrol.  The 
challenge presented by this is that the behavior of the mobile object needs to be predicted 
ahead of time so that it can be modeled within the network. An inaccurate model quickly 
reveals the fake traffic and real source node(s) [15]. 
3. FitProbRate 
The FitProbRate scheme is a strategy introduced in [6]. The FitProbRate scheme 
allows for dummy traffic to be generated using an exponential probabilistic distribution 
function (PDF). FitProbRate improves upon the periodic collection approach discussed 
above by reducing the network transmission delay and overhead. The FitProbRate 
scheme is comprised of four algorithms which generate the traffic, calculate the delay to 
send real event data, and calculate the proper delay for subsequent dummy traffic to 
recover the mean of the probabilistic distribution. FitProbRate adjusts the flow of traffic 
to maintain the PDF and reduce real event latency [6]. This process is illustrated in Figure 
5.  
 
Figure 5.  The example in this figure illustrates the entire FitProbRate process 
from determination of initial intervals and detection and transmission 
of real event data to adjusted transmission of dummy traffic to regain 




In Figure 5, A, B, and E represent the intervals during which dummy traffic is 
transmitted per the PDF. A real event occurs at C and is transmitted after a brief delay at 
D. The dummy traffic which would have been transmitted at E is instead transmitted at F 
to recover the mean of the PDF.  
A disadvantage of FitProbRate is that the algorithms require significantly more 
computation than periodic collection. The advantage of this implementation is that there 
is a significant reduction in overhead associated with dummy traffic and data latency, 
making it suitable for a broader range of applications. The most significant limitation for 
FitProbRate is the scalability [6]. A large active network quickly returns to similar 
latency levels or has to generate significant dummy traffic, negating the advantages over 
simpler schemes.  
B. SINK NODE APPROACHES 
The challenge of location privacy for the sink node is that the network traffic is 
asymmetric, with nodes further from the sink node seeing dramatically less traffic than 
nodes within immediate range of the sink node.  
1. Deceptive Packets 
Deceptive packets are generated from low traffic volume sensor nodes and take 
care to avoid routing through high traffic areas, ending their transmission at another low 
traffic volume node [5]. The deceptive packets protocol assumes that the adversary is 
conducting traffic analysis within the WSN and is able to correlate data transmissions to 
determine the end to end path. The Belief is a value which denotes the adversary’s 
confidence that the destination node is the sink node [5]. The goal of using deceptive 
packets is to make the belief values of other nodes similar to or higher than the sink node. 
This approach is similar to the source simulation approach for source-location privacy. 
The two are differentiated by the method to generate these deceptive packets. Unlike 
source simulation where the nodes generating false traffic are seeded prior to deployment 
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of the WSN, the deceptive packets protocol is adaptive. Sensor nodes use online data 
processing to evaluate the belief value for each node and determine where traffic should 
be generated from and where it is destined to go. 
A disadvantage to the deceptive packet approach is that its performance is highly 
variable. In order to evaluate the belief values, the adversary must analyze the data it has 
collected. Deceptive packets utilize online processing to mimic the adversary’s belief 
calculations and determine where additional traffic should be generated. If the adversary 
is calculating the belief values at a different rate than the additional deceptive packets are 
being generated, then it is possible that the adversary may not be foiled by the deceptive 
packets. The largest limitation of this is that there is a significant amount of 
communication overhead associated with evaluating the belief and adjusting the volume 
and location of the deceptive packets. It is difficult to optimize minimizing 
communications overhead and normalizing the belief value of multiple nodes.  
2. Location Privacy Routing  
In the Location Privacy Routing (LPR) protocol, each sensor divides its neighbors 
into two lists: a closer list consisting of neighbors who are closer to the sink node, and a 
further list consisting of neighbors that are further from the sink node. When a sensor 
forwards a packet, it randomly selects a neighbor from one of the two lists. The route for 
multiple messages originating from the same source node is not always the same because 
the next hop is randomly selected. The two lists make it more difficult to predict the next 
hop and direction of the sink node because traffic does not always travel in the cardinal 
direction of the sink node [16]. Ultimately, this means that an adversary who is 
conducting a packet tracing attack has to take many more hops before reaching the sink 
because it is frequently deviated in the wrong direction.  
If we apply LPR alone, the protection for location privacy is not significantly 
strong. This is because the overall traffic trend in the network still points towards the sink 
node. Although this problem can be alleviated by increasing the probability that a sensor 
forwards to a neighbor on the further list, it leads to a longer delay and higher energy 
costs [16].  
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One way to overcome this is to combine LPR with fake packet injection similar to 
deceptive packets. The basic idea of fake packet injection is that when a sensor node 
forwards a real data packet, it may generate a fake packet and transmit it to a neighbor 
randomly chosen from the further list. This leads an adversary away from the sink node, 
distributes the direction of outgoing packets while reducing data latency for real data, and 
increases the location privacy of the sink node in the WSN. These methods complement 
one another but are ultimately challenged by a global adversary who can see that all real 
messages ultimately always arrive at the sink while fake messages do not.  
3. k- anonymity 
The goal of the k-anonymity algorithm is that at least k entities exhibit the same 
characteristics as nodes located close to the sink. In order to achieve k-anonymity, a 
Euclidian minimum-spanning tree-based routing algorithm is proposed to route traffic so 
that traffic volumes are equally high at k sensor nodes in the WSN. Since at least k nodes 
exhibit similar traffic statistics, an adversary trying to locate the sink node has to locate 
and inspect all nodes within the communication range of each node [10]. 
However, positioning k designated nodes within the WSN is complex as it affects 
two conflicting goals: the routing energy cost and the achievable privacy level [10]. This 
is ultimately an optimization problem which requires prioritizing one goal or the other.  
4. Randomized Routing with Hidden Address  
The methods discussed thus far have assumed a passive adversary whose methods 
are limited to observing network traffic. An active attacker can compromise a node and 
read the header field of a packet to identify the receiver.  The Randomized Routing with 
Hidden Address (RRHA) scheme keeps the identity of the location of the sink secret in 
the network. Sensors do not know who and where the sink is when routing packets and 
do not specify a destination when reporting their measurements. The packets are 
forwarded along different random paths for a specified path length and are then discarded 
when the length is reached [17].  
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The random path taken by RRHA introduces some packet delay. The longer a 
packet lingers in the WSN, the more energy it consumes. When there is high traffic 
volume, the delay caused by the random paths can accumulate to cause significant 
network congestion, exaggerating the delay further and degrading the performance. The 
major limitation of RRHA is that it cannot guarantee that the sink will receive the data. 
Simulations showed that the longer the path length, the higher the success rate of 
information reaching the sink [17]; however, in many time sensitive applications this is 
clearly an unsatisfactory outcome. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
We know that the most successful protection for a sink node against a malicious 
adversary’s attack is to remain anonymous in role, identity, and location [18]. Detailed 
within this chapter is some of the current research on how to address privacy in wireless 
sensor networks. It is important to note the limitations associated with these approaches 
as they are the compelling reason to continue research in this field.  
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III. ENERGY CONSERVATION IN WIRELESS SENSOR 
NETWORKS 
Energy conservation in a WSN is a crucial issue as sensor nodes are all powered 
by limited battery sources. Energy efficient design of a WSN has drawn considerable 
attention from many researchers. This has resulted in the development of various 
approaches for saving the limited energy of the sensor nodes, thereby extending the life 
of the network [19, 20, 21, 22]. 
Sensors utilize their energy for sensing and processing data as well as transmitting 
and receiving data. The communication subsystem of a sensor node (as discussed in 
Chapter I, Section A) consumes more energy than the processing subsystem. It has been 
shown that transmitting one bit of data may consume as much energy as executing a few 
thousand computational instructions [19]; thus, it is important that energy efficiency be 
targeted towards the communications subsystem as only minimal gains are attained by 
optimizing the energy of the sensing and processing subsystems. In order to develop 
energy efficient communication mechanisms in a WSN, we focus on the network layer of 
the protocol stack. Efficient algorithms can be developed at the network layer such that 
reliable route setup and relaying of data from the sensor nodes to the sink is achieved and 
the lifetime of the network is maximized [7].  
A. ENERGY EFFICIENT ROUTING 
Energy efficient routing protocols for WSN can be broken into three broad 
categories: data centric protocols, hierarchical or clustering based protocols, and location 
based or geographical protocols. Within these categories, three popular approaches have 
emerged. Data centric routing techniques utilize a query driven model to reduce the 
amount of transmitted data and are also able to aggregate data while relaying it to the 
sink. Directed Diffusion and Adaptive Protocols for Information Dissemination in 
Wireless Sensor Networks (SPIN) are the dominant data centric protocols [3]. Low 
Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) is chief among the hierarchical or 
clustering based protocols.  
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These three methods have become common performance baselines, with the 
majority of energy efficient routing research focused on improving their performance. 
Some of the parameters which are used to evaluate these routing protocols are compared 
in Table 1.  
Table 1.    SPIN, LEACH, and Directed Diffusion are compared with 
one another, from [2]. 
 
 
1. Directed Diffusion 
Directed diffusion finds routes from multiple sources to a single destination that 
allows in-network consolidation of redundant data (aggregation) [20]. The sink node 
advertises an interest or what information it is interested in receiving. The interest is 
propagated through the WSN. Each node that receives the interest remembers who sent it 
and sets up a gradient, which is a list of neighboring sensors which have the same 
interest. Upon sensing an event matching the sink node's interest, the sensor generates a 
data packet and sends it to the sink via the neighbors for which it has a gradient. A node 
that receives this message checks if it has received the identical message before. If an 
identical data item exists in the cache, the node drops the message. If this data item does 
not exist in its cache, the node determines the matching interest and resends the data 
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along the gradient towards the neighbor [20]. This process is repeated by each node 
receiving the data packet. The data packets are called exploratory packets since they are 
sent to the sink along multiple paths. Eventually, in the last phase of directed diffusion, 
the sink reinforces the path from which, for example, it received the first exploratory data 
packet. This means that only one path is selected from the sink to the packet source, and 
this is the route that is used by the sensor to deliver data to the sink. The general approach 
that directed diffusion takes is illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.  A simplified schematic for directed diffusion, from [21]. 
Directed diffusion has several disadvantages which limit its application. The 
query driven data delivery in this algorithm is a potential liability because many WSNs 
require continuous or periodic data delivery to the sink node. This requires the sink to 
constantly be requesting information from the source nodes, reducing the proposed 
energy savings and increasing congestion on the network. Also, the gradients which are 
selected to route traffic from the source to sink do not perform any load distribution. The 
weakness in this approach is that if one sensor or group of sensors is particularly active, 
they could deplete the energy on one path to the extent it is rendered unusable even if the 
lifetime of the WSN is extended.  These are two limitations that can potentially be 
improved upon with minor modification to the directed diffusion protocol [21].  The 
largest disadvantage of the directed diffusion algorithm is the lack of location privacy it 
provides. In particular, traffic using directed diffusion converges towards the sink node, 
ultimately revealing the sink node’s identity as well as the identity of nearby high volume 
sensor nodes. There is little that can be done to mitigate this within the directed diffusion 
framework, leaving the network vulnerable to high value target attacks.  
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2. Sensor Protocols for Information via Negotiation  
SPIN relies on two key innovations to manage the energy consumption of sensors 
in a WSN: negotiation and resource- adaptation. [22]. SPIN nodes negotiate with each 
other before transmitting data. Negotiation helps ensure that only useful information is 
transferred. Meta-data is exchanged in SPIN negotiations to describe the information a 
node has to share and prevents the flooding of redundant data messages through the 
WSN. Each sensor node has its own resource manager that keeps track of resource 
consumption; applications probe the manager before transmitting or processing data. This 
allows sensors to cut back on certain activities when energy is low including forwarding 
third party data.  This process is illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.  The SPIN protocol schematic. (1) Node A starts by advertising its 
data to node B. (2) Node B responds by sending a request to node A. 
(3) The requested data is received. (4) Node B then sends out 
advertisements to its neighbors. (5) Neighbors respond by sending a 
request back to node B. (6) Node B sends the data to neighbors who 
requested it, from [22]. 
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SPIN offers an improvement on flooding, but there are still limitations and 
inefficiencies. One challenge with SPIN is related to the meta-data descriptors which 
advertise the data. To achieve energy savings, these advertisements must be smaller than 
the data itself but must be unique and descriptive enough to inform the neighboring nodes 
of the available information. The largest limitation of SPIN is that SPIN’s data 
advertisement mechanism cannot guarantee delivery of data [21].  If intermediate nodes 
between the source and sink are not interested in the data which is being advertised, then 
the data is not delivered to the destination.  
Improvements to SPIN which address some of these liabilities have been 
proposed in MSPIN [23] and SPIN-1 [24].  
3. Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy  
Clustering transformed a flat network into multiple tiers, known as clusters, to 
segments the network. The partition of the WSN into clusters is illustrated in Figure 8 as 
a Voronoi diagram.  
 
Figure 8.  Representation of a WSN segmented into clusters with each cluster 
having its own CH. Cluster heads are represented by the solid circles 
in the diagram and sensor nodes are represented by open circles, 
from [25]. 
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Cluster heads (CH) are used to perform data aggregation and/or data fusion before 
forwarding information onto the sink. Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy 
(LEACH) is a clustering based protocol that aims to minimize energy dissipation in 
sensor networks [25]. Sensor nodes form clusters and elect CHs which are then 
responsible for transmitting data to the sink node. Nodes within the cluster achieve 
energy savings by transmitting only to the CH. LEACH then rotate CHs to distribute 
energy requirements among all the sensors. Additionally, LEACH performs local 
computation at each CH (data aggregation) to reduce the amount of data that must be 
transmitted to the sink. This saves both energy and bandwidth.  
LEACH was originally developed when sensor technology was quite new. Thus, 
there are a number of limitations to its practical application for current situations. LEACH 
assumes all nodes can transmit with enough power to reach the sink if needed, which limits 
its utility for a WSN deployed over a large area [2]. In this sense, LEACH is not scalable 
for a broad number of applications. Also limiting the application of LEACH is that it was 
developed for sensing at a fixed rate and cannot support event driven or time sensitive 
reporting. The biggest limitation of LEACH stems from the fact that its primary focus of 
LEACH is of the network lifetime. It was not developed with security as a concern and has 
no features which address the security or privacy of data within a WSN.  
In the years since LEACH was published there has been additional research to 
address some of these limitations including E-LEACH, M-LEACH, LEACH-C and V-
LEACH [3]. However, the solutions proposed in these LEACH extensions are not 
comprehensive.  
B. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The current models and approaches to energy conservation in a WSN were 
detailed in this chapter. We discussed various energy saving mechanisms introduced in 
the literature and their limitations in terms of network security so that we can best 
evaluate the performance gains of our research.  
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
Modeling a WSN to use in an experimental setup is particularly challenging 
because different applications require different modeling parameters.  In this 
experimental setup, we strive to make the model as realistic as possible within the 
confines of the simulation platform. While privacy concerns of WSNs have been 
addressed in the literature, many do not use a realistic model that mirrors real world 
applications of WSNs, thus limiting their practicality.  Our research motivations stem 
from the use of WSNs for military applications; therefore, it is our intention to make 
modeling decisions in line with real world use.  
A. NETWORK MODEL 
Commercially available and military grade sensors come with a wide range of 
capabilities. In this section we discuss these variations and the assumptions we make for 
our network model. 
1. Sensing Range and Transmission Range 
 The sensing range of a sensor is the maximum distance which a sensor can sense. 
More specifically, any event is said to be detectable if it lies within the sensing range. 
The transmission range of a sensor is the maximum distance which a sensor can 
communicate information. In this thesis, the sensing and transmission ranges for all the 
sensor nodes are uniform. The sensing and transmission ranges are controlled by two 
different subsystems of the sensor node and do not have to be equal. In this thesis we 
assume that the sensors are placed within sensing range of their target, and we are not 
concerned with the difference between the sensing and transmission range. We also 
assume that each sensor node is equipped with an omni-directional antenna which allows 
the sensor to sense and communicate in every direction, and the transmission range is 
fixed at 40 meters. A sensor is able to exchange information with all neighboring nodes 
within this range.  
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2. Event Driven and Periodic Reporting 
WSNs generally fall into one of two categories for sensing and communicating 
information. In event driven reporting, the sensors of a WSN immediately relay the 
information that they sense. In periodic reporting, the sensors of a WSN collect 
information and relay it on a fixed schedule. For military use, we assume all information 
is relevant and time sensitive; thus, we assume event driven reporting.  
3. Sink Node Resources  
It is assumed that all of the nodes have identical resources with the exception of 
the sink node. The sink node has the same fixed transmission range as the other nodes but 
has more processing and power resources to handle traffic volume and relaying of 
information outside of the WSN.  
4. Data Exfiltration from the Network 
The sink node is assumed to be inside “friendly lines” and is not sensing but only 
receiving traffic from the network.  The sink node acts as a gateway between the multi-
hop network of sensor nodes and the wired network infrastructure or a repository where 
the sensed information is analyzed [10]. We assume that once this information arrives at 
the wired network, it is not vulnerable to malicious traffic analysis and does not have the 
same privacy concerns.  
5. Number of Sink Nodes 
WSNs may have more than one sink node. For simplicity, we assume that the 
network only has one. Additional sink nodes can be utilized for load balancing or 
redundancy to increase network reliability. While the contributions of this work can be 
expanded to show similar results with multiple sink nodes, we do not investigate the 
multi-sink scenario in this thesis. 
6. Passive Receipt of Messages  
There is no acknowledgement of messages received in the WSN. This means that 
the transmitting sensor node has no way of knowing whether or not the information it 
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reports arrives at the sink node. This is standard practice in WSNs as the tradeoff is made 
between a two-fold increase in network traffic and conservation of limited network 
resources.  
7. End to End Encryption 
It is assumed that information is encrypted at the sensing node and is not 
decrypted until it reaches the sink node. It could be decrypted and encrypted at each hop 
but would require more processing power from each intermediate node. 
B. THREAT MODEL 
The sink node is the aggregating point for data collection within the WSN. This is 
a high value target for the enemy. By locating the sink’s physical location an enemy can 
attack it and, thereby, affect a commander’s ability to utilize the WSN to collect 
battlefield intelligence and plan operations. The capabilities of the adversary affect how 
we choose to defend the network and evaluate the success of the proposed algorithm. We 
assume the following capabilities. 
1. Global Knowledge 
An attacker can easily eavesdrop on the radio communication either by 
purchasing his/her own sensor devices or by leveraging other radio devices capable of 
monitoring message transmission [11]. In doing so the attacker is able to view all traffic 
on the WSN. 
2. Passive Observation 
The adversary is not interested in interfering with the regular communications of 
the WSN. Attackers will use information like packet transmission time and frequency to 
perform traffic analysis and infer the locations of monitored objects and sinks [10].  
3. Encryption 
An advanced adversary will be aware of the encryption protocols utilized; 
however, we assume that he/she will not possess the encryption key. The adversary will 
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then only able to ascertain contextual information such as traffic volume, the number of 
messages that arrive and depart each node, and possibly the cardinal direction of the 
traffic.  
C. THE MATLAB MODEL 
The MATLAB model used in this thesis is constructed based on the following 
parameters. 
1. Simulation Setup 
The model which will be used in this experiment is a square 100 meter by 100 
meter area. There are 100 nodes in the model. This number can easily be adjusted but is a 
reasonable number based on the size of the geographic area and range of nodes. One 
hundred nodes ensure ample coverage of the area of interest and connectivity of the 
WSN.  
2. Placement of Nodes 
 The nodes are randomly distributed throughout the entire area. Nodes can be 
placed one of three ways: air, mounted patrol, or foot patrol [9]. In the case of the aerial 
and mounted patrol emplacement of the sensors, the distribution can best be described as 
random. On a foot patrol the placement of the sensor nodes is more careful and deliberate 
in the area of interest. From a global view of the sensor area, the placements do not 
follow any pattern and can be modeled by a random distribution as well. This model 
applies to all three placement methods. 
3. Placement of Sink Node 
The sink node is deliberately placed at the location (x,y)=(25 meters, 75 meters). 
The location of the sink node is deliberate because the team responsible for deploying the 
WSN deliberately places the sink node, likely co-locating it with their observation post. 
The exact coordinates are not significant in this experimental setup. The only significance 
is that the sink node is not randomly placed.  
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All of this information is coded in MATLAB, and the final result is depicted in 
Figure 9. The MATLAB code is included in an appendix at the end of this thesis.  
 
Figure 9.  The MATLAB model of the experimental setup is 100 m 100 m 
with 100 nodes. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter we explained the experimental setup and modeling assumptions. 
The MATLAB model of the physical topology which simulations were run on was also 
introduced. 
 28 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 29 
V. CLUSTER BASED ROUTING TO ACHIEVE ANONYMITY 
As discussed in Chapters II and III, there is a substantial amount of ongoing 
research in the fields of both privacy and energy conservation in WSNs. In order to 
achieve energy constrained anonymity, we propose a routing algorithm based on node 
clustering which results in at least n other nodes having similar observable traffic 
statistics, thus obfuscating the sink node’s location.   
The steps that the WSN takes upon deployment to route traffic are as follows: 
 CH election and cluster formation. The election of CHs is discussed in 
Section A1 of this chapter.  
 Choose a subset of the CHs to serve as broadcast CHs. The election of 
broadcast CHs, their importance in the network and the role they play in 
achieving sink node anonymity is discussed in Section A3 of this chapter.  
 CHs use Dijkstra’s algorithm to determine their route to the sink node’s 
CH. Dijkstra’s algorithm is discussed in Section B of this chapter.  
A. CLUSTERING 
Clustering is a standard approach for achieving efficient and scalable performance 
in sensor networks. Clustering nodes into groups saves energy and facilitates distribution 
of control over the network [25]. To form clusters, sensor nodes must first elect a CH for 
each cluster. Nodes in the WSN which are not CHs find the closest CH within range and 
become cluster members. The nodes in a cluster only communicate with one another and 
the CH. Data sensed by a node is transmitted to its CH. The CH is responsible for all 
routing and communication external to the cluster. This yields energy savings over a 
“flat” topology, where each node must determine the route from source to sink node.  For 
these reasons, the first step in our proposed algorithm is the initialization and formation 
of clusters. All of the nodes in the WSN either elect to become a CH or join a cluster as a 
cluster member, with the exception of the sink node. The sink node is always a cluster 
member in the WSN; it is never elected to be a CH. We force this constraint on the sink 
node because, if the sink node is always a CH, then it becomes clear to an adversary 
conducting traffic analysis that after a few CH rotations the sink node is the only node 
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constantly re-elected to the role of CH. This leads the adversary to conclude the sink node 
(one of several CHs) has a more significant role in the WSN. 
1. Cluster Head Election 
Each sensor in the WSN may elect to become a CH with a fixed probability p 
when the network is deployed. There is not an optimal number of CHs for a WSN. For 
every topology the clustering process must ensure that no nodes become isolated and that 
there are no more clusters than necessary as excess clusters reduce the energy savings 
yielded from clustering.  
An iterative approach is utilized to balance the competing demands of preventing 
isolation and achieving energy efficiency. In this thesis the probability of a sensor node 
electing to become a CH p is fixed at 0.20. This value was experimentally determined so 
that most of the CHs are elected in the first iteration, while the additional two iterations 
serve to ensure that no sensor node is isolated in the WSN.   
As stated earlier in this section, the sink node is never a CH; therefore, the sink 
node does not go through the process of electing to become a CH. The sink node simply 
looks for the nearest CH to join as a cluster member. The CH that serves the sink node is 
referred to as the sink node’s CH. We determined over 1000 different topologies where 
the mean number of possible sink node CHs is 39, with the minimum being 22 and the 
maximum being 53, so there is always be a node within range to serve as the sink node’s 
CH. If each of these nodes elects with a probability of 0.2 to become a CH, then there is a 
0.01% chance (based on the average number of nodes) that none of these nodes elect to 
become a CH. If this condition happens, then the network reinitializes and repeats the CH 
election process. These simulations and calculations are detailed in Table 2, where SNCH 
refers to the sink node’s CH. 
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Table 2.   One thousand different topologies were generated and 
evaluated to determine the probability that the sink node does not have a 
CH within range. 
 
 
In the MATLAB model, each iteration of CH election is marked with a different 
symbol; however, they all fulfill the same role. Using different symbols facilitates 
tracking and visualization of the steps of the iterations. There is no requirement that each 
iteration yield additional CHs. For this thesis we model a 100 node WSN; however, for 
clarity and simplicity, the images in this chapter are for a 30 node WSN. 
a. First Iteration 
In the first iteration, each node may elect to become a CH with a probability p. If 
a node does not become a CH, then it determines if there is a CH within transmission 
range. At the end of the first iteration, nodes belong to one of three categories: 1) node is 
a CH, 2) node is within range of a CH and 3) node is not a CH or within range of a CH. 
The first iteration of CH election is shown in Figure 10.  
Mean # of Possible SNCH 39.93
Median # of Possible SNCH 37
Min # of Possible SNCH 22
Max # of Possible 53
Calculated with Mean 0.01350154
Calculated with Median 0.02596148
Calculated with Minimum 0.73786976
Calculated with Maximum 0.00073075
Sink Node Cluster Head (SNCH) Options
Probability Zero nodes within Sink Node 
Range Elect to Become CHs
1000 Topologies Generated 
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Figure 10.  The first iteration of CH elections where the CHs are denoted by a 
red plus sign and the sink node is denoted by a blue star. Open green 
circles represent the remaining sensor nodes. 
b. Second Iteration 
In the second iteration, all nodes that belong to category three at the end of the 
first iteration again elect to become a CH with probability p. All nodes which have not 
elected to become a CH in either iteration find the nearest CH within transmission range 
and elect to become a cluster member. The second round of CH election is shown in 
Figure 11. If desired, the steps of the second iteration can be repeated as additional 
iterative steps. The benefit of additional iterations is that a lower initial p can be used. 
Using a lower p results in a more gradual election of additional CHs. With each iteration 
a few more CHs are elected until there is adequate connectivity coverage across the 
WSN. The more gradually CHs are elected, the more optimal the final number of CHs; 
however, there is an energy cost associated with executing each iteration. In this thesis 
the total number of iterations is kept to three. We found that three iterations are sufficient 
to ensure that no nodes are isolated, and all nodes belong to a cluster. 
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Figure 11.  The second iteration of CH elections. The newest CHs elected 
during this iteration are denoted by a black diamond. 
c. Final Iteration 
In the final iteration, any remaining nodes which are not in a cluster, that is not a 
CH or a cluster member, elect to become a CH. The final representation of the WSN with 
all elected CHs is shown in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12.  The final round of CH elections, where all nodes which are not part 
of a cluster become CHs. These CHs are denoted by a red star. 
2. Rotating the Cluster Heads in the WSN topology 
The use of a clustering hierarchy improves the overall energy efficiency of the 
WSN. Only CHs calculate routes and route traffic, which is a considerable savings over 
each node acting independently to route traffic. Clustering also imposes a substantial 
energy burden on the nodes that act as CHs; therefore, it is necessary to rotate the role of 
CH within the WSN.  
We rotate the CHs for two reasons: load balancing and privacy. The CHs are 
reelected in the same manner they were initially elected. The CHs are rotated when one 
of two conditions are met. Either one of the CHs has expended a certain amount of 
energy or a specific number of messages have been transmitted through the WSN. 
Implementing CH rotation allows us to distribute the burden of being the CH across the 
WSN while increasing the overall lifetime of the WSN. The CHs are rotated if 1) any CH 
expends one percent of its initial energy value /100oE , where oE  denotes the initial node 
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energy or 2) the sink node’s CH receives 1000 messages. We set the energy threshold to 
one percent because the energy costs of routing traffic in the WSN are relatively low. If 
we waited for more energy to be consumed, for example 5%, the CHs would only rotate 
when the number of messages threshold was met. We choose to rotate fairly often 
because we do not want the cluster topology of the WSN to be static for long periods of 
time. With a static topology it is plausible that the adversary could locate and inspect 
each node for which traffic is broadcast to in an effort to find the sink node [10]. Rotating 
the CHs increases the privacy of the sink node by randomizing the paths that traffic takes 
through the WSN and makes it more difficult for an adversary to draw any conclusions as 
to the location of the sink node. 
3. Broadcast Cluster Head Election 
The CHs in the WSN are responsible for routing data from the source node’s CH 
to the sink node’s CH. When forwarding data to the next node, each CH has two options. 
The message can be directly forwarded to the next node or widely broadcast to all sensors 
within range. In this algorithm we propose that a subset of CHs is selected to broadcast. 
One key consideration to broadcasting is overhead. We are aware that information is 
being transmitted to nodes that do not need it. In order to reduce overhead and limit 
broadcast information, we only allow a subset of CHs to broadcast to their members. The 
sink node’s CH always broadcasts the messages it receives so that the sink node can 
receive the information. By broadcasting traffic to nodes other than the sink, we are 
essentially creating a situation where multiple nodes resemble the sink in terms of traffic 
volume. In other words, from the adversary’s perspective, these multiple nodes are acting 
like sink nodes. In addition to the traffic volume, the cardinal direction of traffic is also 
disturbed. An attacker cannot use traffic volume for traffic direction to determine a sink 
node’s location; thus, the cost of attacking each of these nodes is much higher than 
attacking just one (the sink node).  
In choosing the broadcast CHs there are two key considerations: 1) The amount of 
residual energy remaining for the CH and 2) the number of cluster members of each 
cluster. The total number of broadcast cluster nodes is variable based on the number of 
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members in each node. A lower threshold of 20 nodes broadcast to is established in this 
algorithm to ensure a minimum desired level of anonymity. The number of nodes 
broadcast to directly correlates to the anonymity of the sink node, as discussed later in 
this Chapter in Section D. 
The CHs are ordered by their residual energy levels. The CH with the most 
energy is chosen to be the first broadcast CH. The number of cluster members which are 
broadcast to is then saved. Each subsequent broadcast CH is selected sequentially based 
on the most residual energy. The number of cluster members broadcast to is added to the 
previous value and, when the lower threshold for the number of nodes broadcast to (i.e., 
20) is exceeded, no additional broadcast CHs are selected.  
B. DIJKSTRA’S ROUTING ALGORITHM 
Once broadcast CHs are determined, we must determine the paths that traffic 
takes to reach the sink node’s CH. Note that traffic should always be routed to the sink 
node’s CH, at which point the CH broadcasts data to the sink node and other cluster 
members. A source node with traffic to send always transmits to its CH. More 
specifically, communication paths are established between CHs and not individual sensor 
nodes. 
The path from source node to the sink node’s CH contains other CHs. Of those 
CHs, a subset broadcasts to their cluster members as well as the next hop CH. The 
election of broadcast CHs was discussed in Section A3 of this chapter.  
To establish routing paths, we use Dijkstra’s routing algorithm. Dijkstra’s 
algorithm is a well-known, simple, least-cost algorithm that finds the lowest cost path 
from a source to a destination. Dijkstra’s algorithm finds the shortest paths from a given 
source node to all other nodes by developing paths in order of increasing path length. 
Dijkstra’s algorithm uses link costs to determine viable paths. Link costs are determined 
based on the network application. The first step of Dijkstra’s algorithm is the 
initialization where a source node has the initial path costs to neighboring nodes. The 
second step is finding the next forwarding node beyond the neighboring nodes and 
recording the cost to get to it. The third step is updating the least cost path to each node, 
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based on the information gained in step two [11]. For further details on Dijkstra, we refer 
the reader to [11].   
We implement Dijkstra’s algorithm at each CH to determine the least cost path to 
the sink node’s CH. We used Euclidian distance as the cost between two CHs in 
Dijkstra’s algorithm. The resulting path is the most energy efficient route through the 
WSN without factoring in the additional cost of the broadcast CHs.  
As stated in Chapter I we aim to create an algorithm that is energy efficient. 
Implementing Dijkstra’s algorithm carries a high initial energy cost due to the 
communications overhead necessary to establish the routes; however, our repeated use of 
the resulting least cost path yields energy savings that justify the upfront cost. The 
savings are obtained because all of the network traffic takes the least cost path when it is 
routed.   
C. SOURCE NODE TO SINK NODE PATH SUMMARY 
When the network is deployed and initialized, the CHs are elected, the clusters are 
formed, broadcast CHs are determined, and the CHs implement Dijkstra’s algorithm to 
find the least cost path from source to sink as described in the earlier sections. This 
process is illustrated in Figures 13, 14, 15 and 16. 
 
Figure 13.  The WSN is deployed. All of the sensor nodes are placed randomly 
except the sink node, which is placed at (25 m, 75 m). 
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Figure 14.  The WSN forms clusters with the election of CHs.  
 
Figure 15.  A subset of the CHs become broadcast CHs.  
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Figure 16.  All cluster heads utilize Dijkstra’s algorithm to determine the least 
cost route to the sink node’s CH. Traffic is routing using the results 
of Dijkstra’s algorithm. Broadcast CHs broadcast the data to all their 
cluster members. 
When a source node senses information from its surrounding area, it processes the 
information and transmits the information to its CH. The CH is responsible for routing 
the message to the sink node’s CH. 
While transiting the route from source node’s CH to sink node’s CH, a subset of 
the intermediate CHs (the broadcast CHs) elect to broadcast the message. 
When the sink node’s CH receives a message destined for the sink node, it 
broadcasts the message to all of the sensor nodes which are cluster members.  
D. SINK NODE ANONYMITY 
The goal of developing this algorithm is to ensure that at least n other nodes in the 
WSN have similar traffic statistics as the sink node. Let N be the set of all nodes in the 
WSN and let i denote the total number of nodes. In this thesis i=100 nodes: then, 
 1 2{ , ,..... }iN n n n . (1) 
CH is the set of nodes which serve as CHs. The total number of CHs is denoted as j: 
 
1 2{ch ,ch ,.....ch }jCH  . (2) 
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CM is the set of nodes which serve as cluster members. The total number of cluster 
members is denoted as k: 
 1 2{cm ,cm ,.....cm }kCM  . (3) 
At the end of the final iteration of CH election described in Section A1c of this chapter, 
all nodes in the WSN are either CHs or cluster members: 
 N CH CM   and i= j + k.  (4) 
Each in  in N becomes an element of CH or CM: 
 i bn ch CH   or i bn cm CM  . (5) 
The set CH is then ordered by the residual energy within each node: 
 
5 8{ch ,ch ,.....ch }energy jCH  . (6) 
BBCH is the set of nodes which serve as broadcast CHs and is a subset of CH. The total 
number of broadcast CHs is denoted as m: 
 1 2{bc ,bc ,.....bc }mBCCH   and BBCH CH . (7)  
Each broadcast CH is selected in order of maximum energy remaining: 1 5bc ch , 
2 8bc ch and so on. A broadcast CH broadcasts any data it receives to all of its cluster 
members in addition to the next hop CH. The total number of nodes broadcast to is 









 . (8) 
The anonymity factor of the sink node is denoted as AF and is defined to be: 
 AF= 1/     (9) 
The number of cluster members that belong to each broadcast CH change each 
time the CHs are rotated. To evaluate the anonymity factor, we take the average value of 
the cluster members broadcast to across the simulation: 
 logy
1/ ( )topoAF average   . (10) 
We use the preceding equations to evaluate the results of the simulations in 
Chapter VI. 
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter the cluster routing algorithm was introduced. The first step is the 
network initialization where nodes form clusters comprised of CHs and cluster members. 
A subset of broadcast CHs are also elected. The CHs utilized Dijkstra’s algorithm to find 
an energy efficient route from source node’s CH to the sink node’s CH. The method of 
evaluating the sink node’s anonymity was also introduced.  
The solution proposed in this routing algorithm addresses sink node anonymity 
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VI. SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS 
In order to draw conclusions on the efficacy of the proposed anonymity 
algorithm, random network traffic must be simulated. A master file called simulations 
was developed to implement the network model, run simulated traffic over the modeled 
WSN and collect anonymity and energy metrics as results. 
A trial is defined as one set of traffic messages that are routed across a topology. 
The message traffic was generated in four different volumes: 5,000, 10,000, 15,000 and 
20,000 messages. In this thesis we generated four different physical topologies and 
conducted five trials using each traffic volume on each topology. A different set of traffic 
was randomly generated in each trial. 
A. SIMULATIONS 
We created a number of files in MATLAB to develop the model on which to run 
these simulations and to generate the simulated traffic. They are categorized as follows. 
1. WSN Topology Model 
a. Create_RandomSensorNetwork 
The Create_RandomSensorNetwork file randomly places all sensors inside a 100 
meter by 100 meter square. The files utilizes the MATLAB function rand, which uses 
pseudo random variables drawn from the standard uniform distribution on the open 
interval (0,1). These values represent the x and y coordinates of each sensor node in 
meters in the WSN. The sink node is deliberately placed at the coordinate (x,y)= (25 m, 
75 m). The location of the sink node within the WSN is not relevant, only that the node is 
deliberately placed. This aligns with military applications in which a WSN is tactically 
deployed, and the sink node is co-located with the personnel responsible for deploying 
the WSN. In this file the number of nodes, size of the geographic area, and location of the 
sink node can all be changed if desired. 
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b. EnergyValues 
The EnergyValues file initializes the energy level for all sensors within the WSN. 
It also specifies transmit and receive communication costs and the processing or 
computational costs. The communication costs relative to sensing and processing costs 
were discussed in Chapter III. For simplification, sensing costs are declared minimal and 
are not included in the simulations. When the network is first deployed, all nodes have 
the same initial energy levels. The energy of each node is depleted by the network 
initialization and then the routing of network traffic.  
The fixed transmission range from Chapter IV, Section A1 and fixed packet size 
simplify the communication costs. The transmit and receive communication costs are 
both fixed at 75.0 10 W. The processing cost is 85.0 10 W. The initial energy value of 
the nodes, transmit, receive and processing costs can all be changed in this file.  
2. Clustering Algorithm 
a. ElectCH 
The ElectCH file is responsible for implementing the clustering protocol outlined 
in Chapter V. ElectCH carries out three iterations of electing CHs, but this can be 
modified to include additional iterations. The energy costs of electing CHs are also 
included within this file. The maximum transmission range and probability of a node 
becoming a CH can be changed in this file. ElectCH is also used when the CHs must be 
rotated in the network topology.  
b. CHadj 
The CHadj file creates an adjacency matrix for all of the CHs within the WSN. 
The matrix is reduced to contain only the CHs which are adjacent to one another within 
the maximum transmission range. The energy costs associated with this processing are 
also calculated and applied. The CHadj file returns a matrix called adjCH. 
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c. CH_isotest 
The CH_isotest file evaluates an adjacency matrix to determine if any of the CH 
are isolated. That is, it determines if any CHs are not within the transmission range of any 
other CHs. This function is performed by the MATLAB graphconncomp function. If a 
CH is isolated, the ElectCH file is then applied and new CHs are elected. If new CHs are 
elected, the CHadj file is applied to the new CHs, and the CH_isotest is implemented 
again. This loop continues while there are isolated CHs. If there are no isolated CHs, the 
program continues. Again, the energy costs associated with this are accounted for. 
3. Dijkstra Routing Algorithm  
a. Dij 
The Dij file implements Dijkstra’s algorithm given an adjacency matrix, source 
node and destination node. Given these three inputs, the shortest path from source to 
destination is returned. The Dij code was taken from an existing research paper [26]. 
b. CH_Route 
The CH_Route file utilizes the Dij file to ascertain and store the route from CH to 
sink node’s CH  for each CH. The Dij program is executed at each CH. The route to the 
sink node’s CH is then stored as ClusterHead(i).Rte. This route represents the path that 
network traffic takes across the WSN. 
c. Choose_BroadcastCH 
The Choose_BroadcastCH file determines how many cluster members each CH 
has and the amount of remaining energy in each CH. The CH with the largest amount of 
energy becomes a broadcast CH, and the number of its cluster members is saved. 
Additional CHs become broadcast CHs based on their energy levels, with those with the 
most energy being added first. This continues until at least 20 cluster members are being 
broadcast to. That is, the sum of the number of the cluster members of all of the elected 
broadcast CHs exceeds 20. If the sink node’s CH is not chosen to be a broadcast CH 
based on its energy value, it is added to the set of broadcast CHs, and its members are 
added to the total number of nodes broadcast to.   
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4. Traffic Generation and Simulation 
a. SourceSim 
The SourceSim file utilizes the MATLAB randi function to generate a source 
node matrix. Each entry in the matrix represents a source node that routes traffic to the 
sink node. The network model specifies that the WSN utilizes event driven reporting so 
each value of the SourceSim file is executed sequentially. The total number of messages 
is changed throughout the simulations to 5,000, 10,000, 15,000 and 20,000 messages and 
can be changed in this file to other values. 
b. Sim_Loop_2 
The Sim_Loop_2 file routes the traffic from SourceSim across the WSN. The 
traffic is routed across the network, and the energy value of all of the intermediate nodes 
is decremented. When the conditions to rotate the CHs are met, as outlined in Chapter V, 
Section A2, Sim_Loop_2 rotates the CHs and continues routing traffic until all of the 
traffic has been routed through the network.  
5. Collecting Results 
a. Energy_Metrics 
The Energy_Metrics file returns the maximum, minimum, and average energy 
consumed by the nodes in the WSN. The index of the maximum and minimum energy 
node is also returned. The index of the maximum and minimum energy node is compared 
to the source matrix traffic, returning the number of times the maximum and minimum 
energy nodes route traffic through the WSN over the trial. 
b. Anony_Metrics 
The Anony_Metrics file records the total number of nodes broadcast to and the 
number of members of the sink node’s CH for each rotation of the CHs and returns the 
average number of nodes broadcast to and the average number of nodes in the sink 
node’s CH. The average number of nodes broadcast to is used in Eq. (8) and Eq. (9) to 
calculate the anonymity. 
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6. House Keeping Files 
a. SaveEnergyValues 
The SaveEnergyValues file updates the energy value of each sensor on the master 
list. This is a function of the code and MATLAB but is not a step that needs to be 
executed in an actual implementation as the nodes always know their energy values. 
SaveEnergyValues moves the energy values from ClusterMember(i).E to N(i).E. 
SaveEnergyValues is used immediately prior to re-electing CHs each time.  
b. Plot_Results 
The Plot_Results file returns four figures which are plots of the WSN and the 
iterations of electing CHs. These plots are not a functional part of the routing of network 
traffic but provide a visual representation of the network for the purposes of this thesis. 
Plot_Results uses different symbols to represent the CHs which are elected in every 
iteration.  
B. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
1. Topology 1 
The physical topology of Topology 1 was generated using the 
Create_RandomSensorNetwork discussed in Section A1 of this chapter. The physical 
location of the nodes remains the same throughout Topology 1. Across the five trials at 
each simulated traffic volume, the only thing that changes is the role each nodes plays in 
the WSN. 
a. Energy Results 
The simulations described in Section A of this chapter are conducted over 
Topology 1, and the results are summarized in Table 3. This information is used to 
generate Figures 17, 18 and 19.  
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Table 3.   The average, maximum, and minimum energy consumed by 
nodes in Topology 1 over five trials at each traffic volume. The roles 
played by the maximum energy node contributed to an understanding of 
what drives the energy consumption of the MaxECN. 
 
 
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Energy






























Distance of Max Energy Node from Sink Node 10.4169 10.4169 14.9503 14.9503 7.0315
# of Messages Max Energy Node Sends 57 41 52 57 53
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Member 3 5 5 3 3
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Head 3 1 1 2 2
# of times Max Energy Node is a Broadcast Cluster Head 3 1 1 1 2
# of times Max Energy Node is Sink Node Cluster Head 3 1 1 1 2
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Energy






























Distance of Max Energy Node from Sink Node 17.2641 10.4169 10.4169 10.4169 10.4169
# of Messages Max Energy Node Sends 119 96 83 111 83
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Member 7 6 6 7 8
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Head 4 5 5 4 3
# of times Max Energy Node is a Broadcast Cluster Head 2 5 4 4 3
# of times Max Energy Node is Sink Node Cluster Head 2 5 4 4 2
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Energy






























Distance of Max Energy Node from Sink Node 12.9479 7.0315 7.0315 7.0315 12.9479
# of Messages Max Energy Node Sends 142 174 148 134 171
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Member 11 12 11 10 12
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Head 5 4 5 6 4
# of times Max Energy Node is a Broadcast Cluster Head 4 4 5 6 3
# of times Max Energy Node is Sink Node Cluster Head 4 4 5 6 3
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Energy






























Distance of Max Energy Node from Sink Node 16.4091 7.0315 10.4169 12.9479 7.0315
# of Messages Max Energy Node Sends 244 219 208 195 196
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Member 14 14 14 13 14
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Head 7 7 7 9 7
# of times Max Energy Node is a Broadcast Cluster Head 2 7 6 6 7







Figure 17.  The average energy consumed by the nodes in the WSN for 5,000, 
10,000, 15,000, and 20,000 messages. The average energy consumed 
increases as traffic volume increases in all five trials in Topology 1. 
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Figure 18.  The minimum energy consumed by nodes in the WSN for 5,000, 
10,000, 15,000, and 20,000 messages. The minimum energy 
consumed by a node increases as traffic volume increases in 
Topology 1. At trial 3, 10,000 messages, MinEC deviates from the 
average MinEC at that traffic volume. 
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Figure 19.  The maximum energy consumed by nodes in the WSN for 5,000, 
10,000, 15,000, and 20,000 messages. The maximum energy 
consumed increases as traffic volume increases in all five trials but 
the values are subject to overlapping across message volumes in 
Topology 1.  
We see in Figure 17 that the average energy consumed (AvgEC) by a node in the 
WSN is consistent across the five trials and increases with the increase in traffic volume 
across the WSN.  
The minimum energy consumed by a node (MinEC) is shown in Figure 18. The 
results for the minimum energy follow a similar pattern of increasing when the traffic 
volume increases. There is one anomaly at trial 3, 10,000 messages, where the minimum 
energy consumed at 10,000 messages exceeds the minimum energy consumed at 15,000 
messages. Examining Figure 19, we see that in trial 3, 10,000 messages, the maximum 
energy consumed node is the smallest value among the five trials. We conclude that in 
trial 3, 10,000 messages, the minimum and maximum values for energy consumed were 
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simply closer to the average than in other trials as the average in Figure 17 is consistent 
with the other values.  
We see in Figure 19 that while the general trend of increased consumption with 
increased traffic volume holds, the values of each trial fluctuate significantly. The 
maximum energy consumed by a node (MaxEC) in the WSN has far less predictable 
results than the average and minimum energy values.  
The numerical values for the average, minimum, and maximum energy consumed 
by nodes in the WSN are shown in Table 3. From this table it can be seen that in trial 1, 
20,000 messages, the MaxEC is equal to the average MaxEC of 15,000 messages across 
all five trials. We see in Table 3 that in trial 1 the number of times the maximum energy 
consumed node (MaxECN) serves as a broadcast CH or the sink node’s CH is two, 
compared to six or seven times for the other four trials. Thus, the MaxEC is well below 
the average MaxEC for 20,000 messages. 
 For trial 2, 15,000 messages, the maximum energy consumed is less than trial 2, 
10,000 messages and is near the average MaxEC for 10,000 messages. The number of 
messages the maximum energy consumed node (MaxECN) sends through the WSN is 
typical when compared to other values at the same traffic volume. The number of times 
the MaxECN serves as a CH, broadcast CH and the sink node’s CH is the highest of the 
five trials when 10,000 messages are sent, driving the MaxEC higher. The MaxECN in 
trial 2, 15,000 messages, sends the second highest number of messages through the WSN 
and performs the role of cluster member, CH, broadcast CH, and sink node CH a similar 
number of times as its peers but has a lower MaxEC. We can attribute this to one of two 
factors. The first is that the network initialization of the topology was more efficient in 
this trial, keeping the MaxEC lower. The source of this efficiency is CH_isotest, which 
was discussed in Chapter VI, Section A2. If the topology fails the isolation test and must 
re-elect cluster heads, this imposes an additional energy costs across the WSN. If, as the 
CHs rotate, the topology never fails the isolation test, then the energy consumption is 
lower across the WSN. The other option is that the number of nodes broadcast to when 
the MaxECN served as a broadcast CH and as the sink node’s CH was less than in other 
trials; therefore, the MaxECN was lower.  
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In trial 4, 15,000 messages, the maximum energy consumed is greater than trial 4 
and 20,000 messages and above the 20,000 message average. The number of messages 
the MaxECN sends through the WSN is the lowest of all five trials. However, the 
MaxECN serves as a CH, broadcast CH and sink node’s CH more times than in any other 
trial. These roles require more energy than being a cluster member, so the MaxEC for this 
trial is driven up. 
Table 4.   The total number of nodes broadcast to and the anonymity 
factor for each trial and traffic volume of Topology 1. 
 
 
Trial 5, 15,000 messages, also exceeds the 20,000 message MaxEC average. The 
roles of the MaxECN of trial 5, 15,000 messages, are very similar to trial 2, 15,000 
messages, and yet the MaxEC for trial 5 is highest of the five trials, while the MaxEC for 
trial 2 is the lowest. Looking into Table 4, we see that the average number of nodes in the 
sink node’s CH is at a maximum for trial 5 at 5.9375 and at a minimum for trial 2 at 
4.3750. We conclude that in this case the MaxEC is driven higher by the costs of the 
broadcasting to a larger number sink node cluster members. 
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Avg # of Nodes Broadcast To 27.8333 27.3333 25.0000 24.6000 29.5500
Anonymity Factor 0.0359 0.0366 0.0400 0.0407 0.0338
Avg # of Nodes in Sink Node Cluster Head 6.0000 3.5000 5.3300 3.8000 6.8333
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Avg # of Nodes Broadcast To 24.4545 26.5455 24.0000 26.5455 26.8182
Anonymity Factor 0.0409 0.0377 0.0417 0.0377 0.0373
Avg # of Nodes in Sink Node Cluster Head 4.0909 4.4545 3.1818 4.4545 4.9091
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Avg # of Nodes Broadcast To 27.3125 26.3125 25.9375 26.4735 27.4375
Anonymity Factor 0.0366 0.0380 0.0386 0.0378 0.0364
Avg # of Nodes in Sink Node Cluster Head 5.1520 4.3750 5.3750 4.6350 5.9375
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Avg # of Nodes Broadcast To 27.0952 25.8095 25.9048 27.4762 26.4286
Anonymity Factor 0.0369 0.0387 0.0386 0.0364 0.0378
Avg # of Nodes in Sink Node Cluster Head 4.9524 5.0000 4.9524 5.3333 4.4286






b. Sink Node Anonymity 
The anonymity factor is calculated based on the total number of nodes broadcast 
to, as outlined in Chapter V, Section D. The results returned from Anony_Metrics are 
listed in Table 4 in the preceding subsection and used to calculate the anonymity factor 
for each trial and traffic volume. The average number of nodes broadcast to ranges from 
24.0000 to 29.5550 and exceeds the desired threshold of 20 nodes. The results vary based 
on traffic volume and do not demonstrate any trends of convergence to a number of 
nodes broadcast to or divergence from a number of nodes broadcast to as traffic volume 
increases, is shown in Figure 20. Just as there are no trends in the average number of 
nodes broadcast to, there are no trends on the anonymity factor over the different traffic 
volumes. This is shown in Figure 21. By taking the average of all of the anonymity 




Figure 20.  The average number of nodes broadcast to for different traffic 
volumes over five trials. The average number of nodes broadcast to 
is between 24.0000 and 29.5500 for Topology 1. 
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Figure 21.  The anonymity factor of each trial at each traffic volume for 
Topology 1. 
2. Topology 2 
Just as in Topology 1, the physical topology of Topology 2 was generated using 
the Create_RandomSensorNetwork discussed in Section A1 of this chapter. The physical 
location of the nodes remains the same throughout Topology 2. Across the five trials at 
each simulated traffic length, the only thing that changes is the role each nodes plays in 
the WSN. 
a. Energy Results 
The simulations described in Section A of this chapter are conducted over 
Topology 2, and the results are summarized in Table 5. This information is used to 
generate Figures 22, 23, and 24. 
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Table 5.   The average, maximum, and minimum energy consumed by 
nodes in Topology 2 over five trials at each traffic volume. The roles 
played by the maximum energy node contributed to an understanding of 
what drives the energy consumption of the MaxECN. 
 
 
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Energy






























Distance of Max Energy Node from Sink Node 5.3585 5.4363 5.4363 4.6758 4.6758
# of Messages Max Energy Node Sends 48 48 58 51 37
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Member 2 4 3 4 2
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Head 4 3 3 1 4
# of times Max Energy Node is a Broadcast Cluster Head 3 2 2 1 4
# of times Max Energy Node is Sink Node Cluster Head 3 2 2 1 4
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Energy






























Distance of Max Energy Node from Sink Node 15.0279 2.2242 11.2799 4.6758 2.2242
# of Messages Max Energy Node Sends 100 91 97 107 92
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Member 7 7 6 6 8
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Head 4 4 6 5 3
# of times Max Energy Node is a Broadcast Cluster Head 2 4 4 5 3
# of times Max Energy Node is Sink Node Cluster Head 2 4 4 5 3
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Energy






























Distance of Max Energy Node from Sink Node 4.6758 5.3585 5.3585 5.3585 4.6758
# of Messages Max Energy Node Sends 137 139 142 143 154
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Member 12 9 12 12 11
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Head 5 8 5 5 5
# of times Max Energy Node is a Broadcast Cluster Head 4 5 5 4 3
# of times Max Energy Node is Sink Node Cluster Head 4 5 5 4 3
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Energy






























Distance of Max Energy Node from Sink Node 5.4363 5.3585 11.2799 4.6758 6.4270
# of Messages Max Energy Node Sends 210 208 185 194 231
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Member 14 13 17 15 16
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Head 7 9 6 7 5
# of times Max Energy Node is a Broadcast Cluster Head 6 6 4 5 5







Figure 22.  The average energy consumed by nodes in the WSN for 5,000, 
10,000, 15,000, and 20,000 messages. The average energy consumed 
increases as traffic volume increases in all five trials of Topology 2. 
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Figure 23.  The minimum energy consumed by nodes in the WSN for 5,000, 
10,000, 15,000, and 20,000 messages. The minimum energy 





Figure 24.  The maximum energy consumed by nodes in the WSN for 5,000, 
10,000, 15,000, and 20,000 messages. The maximum energy 
consumed increases as traffic volume increases in all five trials. The 
values across the five trials fluctuate in Topology 2.  
The AvgEC by a node in the WSN is consistent across the five trials and increases 
with the increase in traffic volume across the WSN, as shown in Figure 22. The MinEC 
also follows the same trend, increasing with the increase in traffic volume, though the 
values fluctuate more within the five trials at each traffic volume. This is shown in Figure 
23.  
Just as in Topology 1, the maximum energy consumed increases as traffic volume 
increases in all five trials, but the values are subject to overlapping across traffic volumes.  
The MaxEC of trial 1, 10,000 messages is below the average MaxEc for 5,000 
messages, as shown in Figure 24. The MaxECN serves as a CH a similar number of times 
compared to the other trials; however, it only spends half the time as a broadcast or sink 
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node’s CH, causing the MaxEC to be much lower than the average for this traffic volume 
in Topology 2. In trial 1, 15,000 messages, the MaxEC is below the average MaxEC for 
10,000 messages. The roles played by the MaxECN are similar to the rest of the trials and 
the average number of nodes broadcast to is in line with the other trials at this traffic 
volume. The average energy consumed by a node, illustrated in Figure 22, is on par with 
all other trials at this traffic volume, so we conclude that while below the average for 
10,000 messages, nothing is abnormal in this trial. The MaxECN simply consumed less 
energy.  
In trial 2, 15,000 messages, the MaxECN serves as a CHs eight times, which is 
three more times than any other trial. This contributes to a higher than average MaxEC 
for that trial and slightly exceeds the MaxEC of trial 2, 20,000 messages. The MaxEC of 
trial 2, 10,000 messages is equal to the average MaxEC for 15,000 messages. Examining 
the role of the MaxECN is this trial compared to other trials and the average number of 
nodes broadcast to, we see that there is not a specific factor for this trial that is driving the 
MaxEC to the average of the MaxEC for 15,000 messages. We simply conclude that, 
while the average energy consumed by this trial is similar to the other trials at this traffic 
volume, this trial was less energy efficient in terms of the maximum energy consumed by 
a node.  
In trial 3, 10,000 messages, the MaxEC is equal to that of the average MaxEC of 
20,000 messages. Examining the data in Table 6, we see that the roles performed by the 
MaxEC are similar to the other trials at this traffic volume. The number of nodes 
broadcast to is the lowest of the five trials for 10,000 messages, so it is not contributing to 
the larger MaxEC either.  We see in Figure 19 that the average energy consumed by a 
node in the WSN is also highest at this trial. Thus, we conclude that the WSN 
initialization drove the energy costs up for the trial. The MaxEC of trial 3, 15,000 
messages exceeds the average MaxEC of 20,000 messages. Similar to the case for trial 3, 
10,000 messages, we do not see any one factor contributing to the larger MaxEC. 
The MaxEC of trial 4, 5,000 messages is the lowest of the five trials. We see in 
Table 6 that the MaxECN served only once as a CH, broadcast CH and sink node’s CH. 
This means that in each rotation of the CHs over the trial, a new node served as the sink 
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node’s CH, and there are likely several other nodes in the WSN with energy consumption 
similar to the MaxECN.   
In trial 4, 15,000 messages, the MaxEC is less than the average MaxEC of 10,000 
messages. Examining the data in Table 6, we see that the roles performed by the MaxEC 
are similar to the other trials at this traffic volume. The number of nodes broadcast to is 
near the average of the five trials for 15,000 messages, so it is not contributing to the 
smaller MaxEC either. We see in Table 5 that the average energy expended for a node in 
this trial is also less than the other four trials and conclude this trial was simply more 
energy efficient than the other ones at this traffic volume.  
The MaxEC of trial 5, 15,000 messages is also less than the average MaxEC of 
10,000 messages. The MaxECN served as a CH five times but as a broadcast CH and the 
sink node’s CH only three times. This was the lowest of the five trials and contributed to 
the lower MaxEC.  
b. Sink Node Anonymity 
The anonymity factor is calculated based on the total number of nodes broadcast 
to as outlined in Chapter V, Section D. The results returned from Anony_Metrics are 
listed in Table 6 and used to calculate the anonymity factor for each trial and traffic 
volume.  
The average number of nodes broadcast to ranges from 25.6000 to 31.5833 and 
exceeds the desired lower threshold of 20 nodes. There is a slight increase in the average 
number of nodes broadcast to with the increase in traffic volume, as shown in Figure 25. 
The slight increase in number of nodes broadcast to as traffic volume increases translates 
to a slight decrease in the anonymity factor as traffic volume increases is shown in Figure 
26. By taking the average of all of the anonymity factors calculated in Table 6, we 
calculate to average anonymity factor of the topology to be 0.0357. 
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Table 6.   The total number of nodes broadcast to and the anonymity 





Figure 25.  The average number of nodes broadcast to for different traffic 
volumes over the five trials. The average number of nodes broadcast 
to is between 25.6000 and 31.5833 for Topology 2. 
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Avg # of Nodes Broadcast To 27.0000 26.2857 28.1667 25.6000 26.6667
Anonymity Factor 0.0370 0.0380 0.0355 0.0391 0.0375
Avg # of Nodes in Sink Node Cluster Head 7.0000 11.4286 7.5000 5.2000 6.3333
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Avg # of Nodes Broadcast To 28.3636 27.1818 31.5833 27.1818 29.5455
Anonymity Factor 0.0353 0.0368 0.0317 0.0368 0.0338
Avg # of Nodes in Sink Node Cluster Head 7.3636 6.5455 9.2500 7.0000 8.4545
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Avg # of Nodes Broadcast To 28.0588 29.2353 29.0588 27.5625 27.6875
Anonymity Factor 0.0356 0.0342 0.0344 0.0363 0.0361
Avg # of Nodes in Sink Node Cluster Head 7.8235 7.5882 8.2941 7.0000 7.3125
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Avg # of Nodes Broadcast To 27.8095 29.8636 28.6818 28.0909 27.8095
Anonymity Factor 0.0360 0.0335 0.0349 0.0356 0.0360
Avg # of Nodes in Sink Node Cluster Head 5.9524 7.3182 8.1818 7.2727 6.9048







Figure 26.  The anonymity factor of each trial at each traffic volume for 
Topology 2. 
3. Topology 3 
Just as in the previous topologies, the physical topology of Topology 3 was 
generated using the Create_RandomSensorNetwork discussed in Section A1 of this 
chapter. The physical location of the nodes remains the same throughout Topology 3. 
Across the five trials at each simulated traffic length, the only thing that changes is the 
role each nodes plays in the WSN. 
a. Energy Results 
The simulations described in Section A of this chapter are conducted over 
Topology 3, and the results are summarized in Table 7. This information is used to 




Table 7.   The average, maximum, and minimum energy consumed by 
nodes in Topology 3 over five trials at each traffic volume. The roles 
played by the maximum energy node, contributed to an understanding of 
what drives the energy consumption of the MaxECN. 
 
 
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Energy






























Distance of Max Energy Node from Sink Node 11.2845 5.4562 5.4562 9.0608 5.4562
# of Messages Max Energy Node Sends 41 60 49 59 51
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Member 3 4 3 5 4
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Head 3 2 2 1 2
# of times Max Energy Node is a Broadcast Cluster Head 3 2 2 1 2
# of times Max Energy Node is Sink Node Cluster Head 3 2 2 1 2
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Energy






























Distance of Max Energy Node from Sink Node 8.5039 11.7691 8.5039 8.5039 8.5039
# of Messages Max Energy Node Sends 118 96 97 112 101
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Member 8 8 6 5 9
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Head 3 3 5 6 2
# of times Max Energy Node is a Broadcast Cluster Head 3 3 5 4 2
# of times Max Energy Node is Sink Node Cluster Head 3 3 4 4 2
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Energy






























Distance of Max Energy Node from Sink Node 8.5039 8.5039 8.5039 5.4562 5.4562
# of Messages Max Energy Node Sends 156 148 155 134 150
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Member 8 11 8 12 10
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Head 8 5 8 5 6
# of times Max Energy Node is a Broadcast Cluster Head 4 5 7 5 6
# of times Max Energy Node is Sink Node Cluster Head 4 5 7 5 6
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Energy






























Distance of Max Energy Node from Sink Node 5.4562 7.1535 5.4562 8.5039 11.2845
# of Messages Max Energy Node Sends 201 176 215 181 185
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Member 17 15 15 15 11
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Head 4 6 6 6 10
# of times Max Energy Node is a Broadcast Cluster Head 4 6 6 6 6







Figure 27.  The average energy consumed by nodes in the WSN for 5,000, 
10,000, 15,000, and 20,000 messages. The average energy consumed 
increases as traffic volume increases in all five trials in Topology 3. 
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Figure 28.  The minimum energy consumed by nodes in the WSN for 5,000, 
10,000, 15,000, and 20,000 messages. The minimum energy 
consumed increases as traffic volume increases in all five trials in 
Topology 3. At trial 2, 15,000 messages, MinEC deviates from the 
average MinEC at that traffic volume. 
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Figure 29.  The maximum energy consumed by nodes in the WSN for 5,000, 
10,000, 15,000, and 20,000 messages. The maximum energy 
consumed increases as traffic volume increases from 5,000 to 10,000 
messages. The average maximum energy consumed for 15,000 
messages slightly exceeds the average maximum energy consumed 
for 20,000 messages.  
The AvgEC by a node in the WSN is consistent across the five trials and increases 
with the increase in traffic volume across the WSN, as shown in Figure 27. The MinEC 
also follows the same trend, increasing with traffic volume. When compared to Figure 27, 
we see that the values of MinEC, illustrated in Figure 28, have a larger deviation from the 
average MinEC of the five trials at each traffic volume. 
The result of the Maximum Energy consumed by a node, shown in Figure 29, is 
very peculiar for this topology. The average MaxEC for 15,000 messages is slightly 
higher than the MaxEC for 20,000 messages. In trial 1, trial 3, and trial 5 for 15,000 
messages, the MaxEC is less than the average MaxEC for 20,000 messages, but the 
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overall average is still higher for 15,000 messages than 20,000 messages. The largest 
MaxEC of the two traffic volumes occurs at trial 2, 20,000 messages, but the smallest 
MaxEC of the two traffic volumes occurs at trial 1, 20,000 messages. If we remove trial 
1, 20,000 messages from the data set, the order is restored. Examining Table 7, we see 
that trial 1, 20,000 messages is quite the anomaly only serving as a CH, broadcast CH 
and the sink node’s CH four times compared to a minimum of six the other trials at this 
traffic volume. The average energy expended by a node for trial 1, 20,000 messages, is 
the same as the other trials, so we conclude that while this is an unexpected result this 
trial was simply more balanced in choosing multiple nodes to fill these functions over the 
simulation.  
b. Sink Node Anonymity 
The anonymity factor is calculated based on the total number of nodes broadcast 
to, as outlined in Chapter V, Section D. The results returned from Anony_Metrics are 
listed in Table 8 and are used to calculate the anonymity factor for each trial and traffic 
volume. The average number of nodes broadcast to ranges from 21.8125 to 29.1818 and 
exceeds the desired lower threshold of 20 nodes. The results vary based on traffic volume 
and do not demonstrate any trends of convergence to a number of numbers broadcast to 
or divergence from a number of nodes broadcast to as traffic volume increases, as shown 
in Figure 30. Just as there are no trends in the average number of nodes broadcast to, 
there are no trends on the anonymity factor over the different traffic volumes. This is 
shown in Figure 31. By taking the average of all of the anonymity factors calculated in 
Table 8, we calculate to average anonymity factor of the topology to be 0.0367. 
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Table 8.   The total number of nodes broadcast to and the anonymity 





Figure 30.  The average number of nodes broadcast to for different traffic 
volumes over five trials. The average number of nodes broadcast to 
is between 21.8125 and 29.1818 for Topology 3. 
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Avg # of Nodes Broadcast To 28.5000 27.3333 28.6000 26.0000 25.3333
Anonymity Factor 0.0351 0.0366 0.0350 0.0385 0.0395
Avg # of Nodes in Sink Node Cluster Head 5.5000 8.5000 6.6000 7.0000 5.8333
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Avg # of Nodes Broadcast To 27.2727 29.1818 27.4545 28.2727 27.7273
Anonymity Factor 0.0367 0.0343 0.0364 0.0354 0.0361
Avg # of Nodes in Sink Node Cluster Head 7.2727 6.1818 5.8182 5.9091 8.3636
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Avg # of Nodes Broadcast To 28.0625 26.8750 21.8125 28.0000 27.1875
Anonymity Factor 0.0356 0.0372 0.0458 0.0357 0.0368
Avg # of Nodes in Sink Node Cluster Head 6.6250 7.1250 5.5625 6.4375 6.6250
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Avg # of Nodes Broadcast To 27.3810 28.9524 27.6910 27.0952 26.4286
Anonymity Factor 0.0365 0.0345 0.0361 0.0369 0.0378
Avg # of Nodes in Sink Node Cluster Head 6.3333 7.3333 6.1429 6.2857 4.5238







Figure 31.  The anonymity factor of each trial at each traffic volume for 
Topology 3. 
4. Topology 4 
Just as in the previous topologies, the physical topology of Topology 4 was 
generated using the Create_RandomSensorNetwork discussed in Section A1 of this 
chapter. The physical location of the nodes remains the same throughout Topology 4. 
Across the five trials at each simulated traffic length, the only thing that changes is the 
role each nodes plays in the WSN. 
a. Energy Results 
The simulations described in Section A of this chapter are conducted over 
Topology 4, and the results are summarized in Table 9. This information is used to 




Table 9.   The average, maximum, and minimum energy consumed by 
nodes in Topology 4 over five trials at each traffic volume. The roles 
played by the maximum energy node contributed to an understanding of 
what drives the energy consumption of the MaxECN. 
 
 
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Energy






























Distance of Max Energy Node from Sink Node 3.3141 12.7595 16.0760 10.6008 16.0760
# of Messages Max Energy Node Sends 52 47 52 48 46
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Member 4 3 5 5 4
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Head 2 3 1 1 2
# of times Max Energy Node is a Broadcast Cluster Head 2 3 1 1 2
# of times Max Energy Node is Sink Node Cluster Head 2 3 1 1 2
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Energy






























Distance of Max Energy Node from Sink Node 17.5268 17.2269 17.2269 10.6008 3.3141
# of Messages Max Energy Node Sends 115 89 92 101 88
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Member 7 9 7 7 8
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Head 4 2 4 4 3
# of times Max Energy Node is a Broadcast Cluster Head 2 2 3 4 2
# of times Max Energy Node is Sink Node Cluster Head 2 2 3 3 2
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Energy






























Distance of Max Energy Node from Sink Node 2.8057 13.7577 3.3141 3.3141 2.8057
# of Messages Max Energy Node Sends 134 152 155 151 160
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Member 10 11 10 12 7
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Head 6 5 7 4 9
# of times Max Energy Node is a Broadcast Cluster Head 6 4 5 3 9
# of times Max Energy Node is Sink Node Cluster Head 6 3 5 3 9
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Energy






























Distance of Max Energy Node from Sink Node 10.6008 3.3141 2.8057 2.8057 2.8057
# of Messages Max Energy Node Sends 201 178 188 179 193
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Member 14 14 12 16 15
# of times Max Energy Node is a Cluster Head 7 7 10 5 6
# of times Max Energy Node is a Broadcast Cluster Head 7 3 10 5 6







Figure 32.  The average energy consumed by nodes in the WSN for 5,000, 
10,000, 15,000, and 20,000 messages. The average energy consumed 
increases as traffic volume increases in all five trials. 
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Figure 33.  The minimum energy consumed by nodes in the WSN for 5,000, 
10,000, 15,000, and 20,000 messages. The minimum energy 




Figure 34.  The maximum energy consumed by nodes in the WSN for 5,000, 
10,000, 15,000 and 20,000 messages. The average MaxEC increases 
as traffic volume increases. However, the values of MaxEC vary 
dramatically across the trials. The MaxECN for 15,000 and 20,000 
messages shows the greatest variation of the four topologies. 
The AvgEC by a node in the WSN is consistent across the five trials and increases 
with the increase in traffic volume across the WSN, as shown in Figure 32. The MinEC 
also follows the same trend, increasing with the increase in traffic volume. When 
compared to Figure 32, we see that the values of MinEC, illustrated in Figure 33, have a 
larger deviation from the average MinEC of the five trials at each traffic volume. 
In trial 2, 20,000 messages, the MaxEC is less than the average MaxEC of 15,000 
messages, as shown in Figure 34. We see in Table 9 that the MaxECN served as a 
broadcast CH and sink node’s CH only three times, compared to five or more for the 
other four trials. The average energy expended by a node for trial 2, 20,000 messages is 
the same as the other trials. Thus, we conclude that this trial was simply more balanced in 
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choosing multiple nodes to fill these functions over the simulation lowering the MaxEC. 
This is similar to what we observed in Topology 3. 
The MaxEC of trial 4, 15,000 messages is less than the average MaxEC of 10,000 
messages. The MaxECN performs the roles of cluster member, CH, broadcast CH, and 
sink node’s CH with similar frequency to all other MaxECN at this traffic volume, and 
the average number of nodes broadcast to is near the average of this traffic volume. There 
is no one factor that can be isolated to determine when the MaxEC of this trial is less than 
the average MaxEC of 10,000 messages. We simply conclude that the network 
initialization was more efficient.  
In trial 5, 15,000 messages, the MaxEC is greater than the average MaxEC of 
20,000 messages. The MaxECN serves as a cluster member only seven times compared 
to a minimum of ten in the other four trials at this traffic volume. The MaxECN serves at 
a CH, broadcast CH, and the sink node’s CH nine times. This greatly exceeds the role 
played by any other MaxECN in the trials at this traffic volume and in four out of the five 
trials at the 20,000 message volume. We conclude that while the traffic was simulated in 
trial 5, 15,000 messages, the MaxECN was selected more than half the time to serve in 
roles that consume more energy. This drives the MaxEC for this node well above the 
average for 20,000 messages.  
b. Sink Node Anonymity 
The anonymity factor is calculated based on the total number of nodes broadcast 
to, as outlined in Chapter V, Section D. The results returned from Anony_Metrics are 
listed in Table 10 and used to calculate the anonymity factor for each trial and traffic 
volume. The average number of nodes broadcast to ranges from 23.8333 to 30.0000 and 
exceeds the desired lower threshold of 20 nodes. The results vary based on traffic 
volume. In Figure 35, there is a slight convergence in the average number of nodes 
broadcast to as traffic volume increases. This translates in the same way to the anonymity 
factor. The anonymity factor values become more tightly grouped as traffic volume 
increases, as shown in Figure 36. By taking the average of all of the anonymity factors 
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calculated in Table 10, we calculate to average anonymity factor of the topology to be 
0.0363. 
Table 10.   The total number of nodes broadcast to and the anonymity 




Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Anonymity
Avg # of Nodes Broadcast To 29.3333 30.0000 23.8333 25.6667 26.6667
Anonymity Factor 0.0341 0.0333 0.0420 0.0390 0.0375
Avg # of Nodes in Sink Node Cluster Head 7.3333 9.1667 5.6667 7.1667 7.1667
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Anonymity
Avg # of Nodes Broadcast To 28.2727 27.0000 28.4545 30.5455 25.9091
Anonymity Factor 0.0354 0.0370 0.0351 0.0327 0.0386
Avg # of Nodes in Sink Node Cluster Head 7.5455 6.0000 6.1818 7.3636 6.3636
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Anonymity
Avg # of Nodes Broadcast To 27.7500 26.5000 29.2500 26.6250 26.0625
Anonymity Factor 0.0360 0.0377 0.0342 0.0376 0.0384
Avg # of Nodes in Sink Node Cluster Head 7.0000 5.8750 7.1250 5.8750 5.1250
Trial 1 2 3 4 5
Anonymity
Avg # of Nodes Broadcast To 28.3810 29.3810 27.6667 27.3810 28.7619
Anonymity Factor 0.0352 0.0340 0.0361 0.0365 0.0348
Avg # of Nodes in Sink Node Cluster Head 7.0000 6.8571 6.7619 6.6190 6.2381






Figure 35.  The average number of nodes broadcast to for different traffic 
volumes over five trials. The average number of nodes broadcast to 
is between 23.8333 and 30.0000 for Topology 4. 
 
Figure 36.  The anonymity factor of each trial at each traffic volume for 
Topology 4. 
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5. Energy Efficiency Conclusions 
We have discussed the nuances of each topology in the previous sections and now 
examine the energy efficiency of the algorithm across the four topologies. These are all 
summarized and contained within Table 11.  
Table 11.   The Average, Maximum, and Minimum Energy Consumed 
by a node in the WSN across the four simulated topologies. 
 
 
The average energy consumed by a node at each traffic volume is plotted for each 
topology in Figure 37. We see that the results are very similar to one another. The 
average energy consumed by a node increases as the traffic volume increases for each 
topology. Comparing the results side by side on the same plot, we see that the average 
energy consumed by a node in Topology 1 is consistently less than the other topologies. 
We expect the variation among the topologies as the physical location of the nodes will 
affect the energy consumption of each node in the WSN. 
In several trials of the individual topologies, we could not isolate a single factor 
driving the values for the trial away from the average. For example, for trial 2, 15,000 
messages of Topology 1, we conclude that the network initialization was more efficient. 
In other cases we, describe the network initialization as being less efficient. The source of 





























































































































this comes from CH_isotest discussed in Chapter VI, Section A2. If the topology fails the 
isolation test and must re-elect the cluster heads, this imposes an additional energy cost 
on the WSN, increasing the AvgEC, MinEC, and MaxEC.   
 
Figure 37.  The average energy consumed by a node for all four topologies and 
the average of the four. The average energy consumed by a node in 
the WSN increases as the traffic volume through the WSN increases 
from 5,000 messages to 20,000 messages. The results are consistent 
across the four topologies simulated.  
For each topology we examine the average minimum energy consumed by a node 
at each traffic volume. From Figure 38, we see that Topology 2 consistently has the 
minimum energy consumed by a node. The overall trend is that the consumption 
increases with traffic volume across all four topologies.  Similar to the average energy 
consumed, there is some variation among the results for the four topologies; however, the 
results are very consistent, with no points being large outliers.  
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Figure 38.  The minimum energy values for all four topologies and their 
average. The minimum energy consumed by a node in the WSN 
increases as the traffic volume through the WSN increases from 
5,000 messages to 20,000 messages.  
The maximum energy consumed by a node for each topology and traffic volume 
varies more than the average energy consumed and minimum energy consumed. These 
results are shown in Figure 39. From Figure 39 we see that the maximum energy 
consumed by a node are not as tightly grouped at any of the traffic volumes as they were 
in Figure 37 and Figure 38. Much like in the individual case for each trial in each 
topology, the maximum energy consumed is harder to predict because so many of the 
roles are chosen randomly, creating more variation. 
Considering all four topologies individually and averaged together, we find 
remarkably consistent results for the average amount of energy consumed by a node in 
the WSN. This is promising because the average energy use by each node is an effective 
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parameter for planning overall network lifetime. For simplicity, we did not let any nodes 
die out in these simulations because when nodes die the WSN may become partitioned, 
making the problem more difficult. Our goal was to evaluate the performance of the 
algorithm over a network where all of the nodes were alive.  
 
 
Figure 39.  The maximum energy values for all four topologies and their 
average. The maximum energy consumed by a node in the WSN 
increases as the traffic volume through the WSN increase from 5,000 
messages to 20,000 messages. Topology 1 consistently consumes 
less energy than Topologies 2, 3 and 4, but follows the same general 
trend of increased consumption with increased traffic volume.   
6. Sink Node Anonymity Conclusions  
The sink node anonymity was introduced in Chapter V, Section D in Eq. (9). We 
use this to evaluate the results of the simulations. 
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By taking the average of the five trials at each traffic volume for each topology, 
we eliminate the outliers and see that the average number of nodes broadcast to falls 
between 25.6724 and 28.7712 for all of the topologies. This is a much smaller range than 
we present in any one of the individual topologies. For the traffic volume of 5,000 
messages, the average number of nodes broadcast to and the anonymity factor is tightly 
grouped. At the traffic volume of 10,000 messages, the highest and lowest number 
average number of nodes broadcast to are both present. At 15,000 and 20,000 messages, 
the range that the average values are spread over decreases again. These results are 
shown in Table 12.   
We saw in Topology 1 and Topology 3 that the number of numbers broadcast to 
was independent of the traffic volume; thus, we conclude that the overall anonymity 
factor of any WSN is also independent, as illustrated in Figure 41. This is an important 
conclusion because, if the anonymity factor was reliant on a certain traffic volume, this 
would be a constraint for the employment of the algorithm and our objective is to have 
broad applications. 
This conclusion leads us to examine the average number of nodes broadcast to at 
all message volumes, listed in Table 12, to determine the anonymity factor for the 
topology. We see very consistent results across the four topologies, as illustrated in 
Figure 42 and Figure 43. We see variation between the four topologies, just as we did in 
the energy efficiency conclusions, because some topologies may inherently lend 
themselves privacy preservation schemes. We also see that the results are remarkably 
consistent. The value of the anonymity factor for each topology is under 0.04. This means 
that for any given topology we simulated an adversary conducting traffic analysis of the 
deployed WSN would have a less than 4% chance of finding the sink node on his/her first 






Table 12.   The results of the anonymity metrics is the average number 
of nodes broadcast to across the four topologies and four traffic 
volumes. This is used to determine the anonymity factor of the 




Figure 40.  The average number of nodes broadcast for all four topologies and 
their average at each traffic volume. The number of nodes broadcast 
to varies over each topology and for each traffic volume but stays 
well above the established lower threshold of 20 nodes and in a 
relatively tight group of 25 to 30 nodes. 
Topology 1 Topology 2 Topology 3 Topology 4
Average Number of Total Number of Nodes Broadcast to by algorithm
5000 Messages 26.863320 26.743820 27.153320 27.100000
10000 Messages 25.672740 28.771200 27.981800 28.036360
15000 Messages 26.694700 28.320580 26.387500 27.237500
20000 Messages 26.542860 28.451060 27.509640 28.314320
Topology 26.443405 28.071665 27.258065 27.672045
Anonymity Factor
5000 Messages 0.037225 0.037392 0.036828 0.036900
10000 Messages 0.038952 0.034757 0.035738 0.035668
15000 Messages 0.037461 0.035310 0.037897 0.036714
20000 Messages 0.037675 0.035148 0.036351 0.035318
Topology 0.037817 0.035623 0.036686 0.036138
Average Anonymity Factor Across All Topologies 0.036566
 84 
 
Figure 41.  The anonymity factor of each topology and the average anonymity 
factor calculated at each traffic volume. 
 
Figure 42.  The average number of nodes broadcast to for each topology, with 
all traffic volumes included. After concluding that the anonymity is 
independent of traffic volume we consider all of the data points for 
number of nodes broadcast to for each topology to determine the 
average over the topology.  
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Figure 43.  The anonymity factor for all four topologies. The anonymity factor 
of the topologies is calculated based on the average number of nodes 
broadcast to across all traffic volumes. The results are consistent 
across the four topologies.  
C. POTENTIAL ALGORITHM TRADEOFF 
The energy efficiency and anonymity metrics reflect that the proposed algorithm 
meets the desired result of being a privacy preserving algorithm approach and is also 
mindful of the of overall energy consumption and network lifetime.  
1. Additional Overhead from Broadcasting 
The use of broadcast CHs generates extra network traffic. We see from Table 13 
and Figure 44 that approximately 20 additional nodes receive broadcast traffic when 
compared to only the sink node’s CH broadcasting, regardless of the topology. The extra 
traffic is necessary to achieve our desired level of anonymity, and the return on this extra 
traffic is significant with a more than 10% increase in the anonymity factor of the sink 
node as shown in Figure 45. While the excess traffic can be considered a tradeoff for 
higher anonymity, it  should be noted that many of the schemes for privacy preservation 
in WSN introduced in Chapter II also have has significant overhead but do not achieve 
privacy preservation and energy efficiency simultaneously.  
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Table 13.   A comparison of the average number of nodes broadcast to 
with and without the use of broadcast CHs. The use of broadcast CHs 
increase the number of nodes broadcast to and significantly reduces the 
anonymity factor of the sink node in the WSN. 
 
Topology 1 Topology 2 Topology 3 Topology 4
Average Number of Total Number of Nodes Broadcast to by the algorithm
5000 Messages 26.863320 26.743820 27.153320 27.100000
10000 Messages 25.672740 28.771200 27.981800 28.036360
15000 Messages 26.694700 28.320580 26.387500 27.237500
20000 Messages 26.542860 28.451060 27.509640 28.314320
Topology 26.443405 28.071665 27.258065 27.672045
Anonymity Factor
5000 Messages 0.037225 0.037392 0.036828 0.036900
10000 Messages 0.038952 0.034757 0.035738 0.035668
15000 Messages 0.037461 0.035310 0.037897 0.036714
20000 Messages 0.037675 0.035148 0.036351 0.035318
Topology 0.037817 0.035623 0.036686 0.036138
Average Number of Sink Node Cluster Head Members
5000 Messages 5.092660 7.492380 6.686660 7.300020
10000 Messages 4.218160 7.722720 6.709080 6.690900
15000 Messages 5.094900 7.603660 6.475000 6.200000
20000 Messages 4.933340 7.125980 6.123800 6.695220
Topology 4.834765 7.486185 6.498635 6.721535
Anonymity Factor without Broadcast cluster heads
5000 Messages 0.196361 0.133469 0.149551 0.136986
10000 Messages 0.237070 0.129488 0.149052 0.149457
15000 Messages 0.196275 0.131516 0.154440 0.161290
20000 Messages 0.202702 0.140332 0.163297 0.149360
Topology 0.206835 0.133579 0.153878 0.148776
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Figure 44.  The average number of nodes broadcast to for all four topologies 
with broadcast CH (BCCH). The average number of nodes broadcast 
to decreases to less than ten when only the sink node’s CH 
broadcasts. 
 
Figure 45.  The anonymity factor with the broadcast CH (BCCH). The 
anonymity factor increases (which is a negative) without the use of 
broadcast CHs.  
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The MATLAB files and simulations that were run to evaluate the anonymity 
routing algorithm were reviewed in this chapter. We saw consistent results that 
demonstrate on a realistic network model of a WSN, we can preserve the anonymity of 
the sink node and without sacrificing the network lifetime.  
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
WSNs can be used for a variety of military, civilian and commercial applications. 
This thesis was motived by the proliferation of WSNs for military applications. The 
existing research focused on energy conservation without concern for WSN privacy or 
WSN privacy without concern for the limited resources of a WSN. The research in both 
areas failed to address realistic topologies for real world applications. 
We surveyed the existing research in both the privacy and energy conservation 
fields to look for contributions from both fields which could be brought together to 
develop a routing algorithm that holistically addresses the especially vital issue of sink 
node privacy/anonymity in a resource efficient manner. From the energy conservation 
perspective, we adopted a clustering algorithm which provides energy efficient 
performance [3, 13, 19]. From the privacy perspective, we found concepts on dummy 
traffic generation and methods to define and evaluate the anonymity [5, 9, 10]. We set out 
to implement the algorithm, run simulations and ascertain results so that the algorithm 
could be evaluated for security robustness and energy preservation.  
Our model and routing algorithm were implemented and simulated in MATLAB. 
From our simulations we were able to glean significant results. The anonymity factor is 
independent of traffic volume for the routing algorithm. We found that the anonymity 
factor varied from topology to topology and across the different simulated traffic volumes 
but that the results were ultimately independent of the traffic volume. The average 
number of nodes that were broadcast to by the broadcast CHs ranged from 21 on the low 
end to 32 on the high end and was consistently from 25 to 30. The average anonymity 
across the four topologies was 0.036566. To explain this in simpler terms, an adversary 
conducting traffic analysis of the deployed WSN has a less than 4% chance of finding the 
sink node on his/her first guess when physically searching for the sensor. This is 
significantly better than the conservation schemes discussed in Chapter III where all of 
the traffic converges on the sink node.  
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The average energy consumed by a node, discussed in Chapter VI, Section B5, 
was determined to be consistent across the four topologies in the simulations. This is 
promising because the average energy use by each node is an effective parameter for 
planning overall network lifetime. The average energy consumed by a node and the 
minimum energy consumed by a node both produced consistent results and increase as 
traffic volume increases in all cases. The maximum energy consumed by a node was 
variable on our simulations. Examining the results of the individual topologies, we 
conclude that the MaxECN plays a variety of roles within the WSN, from source node 
and cluster member, to cluster head, broadcast cluster head, and sink node’s cluster head. 
In every trial, at every traffic volume, the MaxECN was the sink node’s cluster head for 
at least one rotation. Each of these roles contributes to the energy consumption of the 
node, and because each of these roles are randomized from acting as source node to 
electing to become a cluster head, the MaxEC is highly variable.  
B. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS 
We set out to address the issue of sink node privacy/ anonymity in a resource 
efficient manner. The contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows: 
 Development and implementation of a network topology and clustering 
algorithm in a resource—efficient manner.  
 Development of a routing algorithm for sink node anonymity. 
 Simulation and evaluation of the routing algorithm for security robustness 
and energy preservation.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that develops a sink node 
anonymity algorithm in a resource efficient manner.  
C. FUTURE WORK 
We believe that bringing these together the notion of energy efficiency and sink 
node privacy is vital to military applications of WSNs. The foundation to simultaneously 
achieve both objectives was provided by this thesis. Future work is suggested as follows. 
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1. The Maximum Energy Consumed Metric 
In this thesis we found that the maximum energy consumed by a node was the 
most variable value of our results. We believe that one possible way to address some of 
these variations is to move away from nodes selecting to become CHs with a fixed 
probability. Some of the variations of LEACH [2,3] have different methods for choosing 
CHs. It is recommended that these methods of electing CHs be implemented and 
evaluated to see if they offer an improvement over the existing approach.  
2. Evaluate Network Lifetime 
We have determined that this routing algorithm is both privacy preserving and 
energy efficient, but we limited our total simulated message traffic to 20,000 messages 
across the WSN. Given the energy consumption trends across all four topologies, we 
believe that the maximum number of messages to pass through the network is much 
higher and that our results will scale accordingly until the point which nodes begin to die 
out. It is recommended that more research be conducted to determine how the algorithm 
performs when nodes begin to die.  
3. Implement Routing Algorithm on a Robust Modeling Platform 
We used MATLAB exclusively in this thesis. There are more robust simulation 
platforms that can be used. Depending on the capabilities of the platform, we can build a 
model that more closely aligns with the actual behavior of a sensor node.  Example 
platforms are QualNet and OpNet. 
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% STEP 1: Generate a network and attribute initial energy values 
  
% Note, may want to pull some parameters out of Create_RSN like max 






% STEP 2 : Cluster Head Cluster Member Topology 
% Check CH adj matrix to make sure that no cluster heads are isolated, 
% rotate cluster heads if they are.  
% Create ADJ Matrix 
CHadj 
% Check for isolation result is vector "t" which is logical 
% CH_isotest also checks the handles reelecting CH and ensuring they 
are 
% not isolated. 
CH_isotest 




















% Create_RandomSensorNetwork % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
%% Network Initialization 
% number of Nodes in Network 
n= 100; 
  
% Boundaries of Network 




% N is data structure for each Node in Field 
% a serves as an index 
  
for a = 1:n 
    N(a).xd= rand(1,1)*xmax; 
    N(a).yd= rand(1,1)*ymax; 
end 
  







% Energy_Values % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
% Initalize the energy in each node  
% Sink node has additional resources 
N(1).E= 2; 
  
% All other nodes have fixed initial energy, Eo 
Eo= .5; 
for aa=2:n 
    N(aa).E= Eo; 
end 
  
% Energy values for Transmit, Recieve, Sense and Computation 
ETx= 50* 0.00000001; 
ERx= 50* 0.00000001;  






% ElectCH % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
%% Elect Cluster Heads 
% Probability of being a cluster head (this is a place marker, there 
should 






for a= 1:n 
    N(a).ch= rand(1,1); 
    % E cost to gen a random # 
    N(a).E= N(a).E- Eprocess; 
end 
  




    if N(a).ch <p 
        CountCH = CountCH +1; 
    end 
end 
  
% May not even be necessary 
if CountCH <=1 
    for a= 1:n 
    N(a).ch= rand(1,1); 





    if N(a).ch <p 
        CountCH = CountCH +1; 
        % Build a structure which has x and y coordinates of all 
clusters 
        ClusterHead(cluster).xd= N(a).xd; 
        ClusterHead(cluster).yd= N(a).yd; 
        ClusterHead(cluster).index=a; 
        % Cost of Comparision to p 
        ClusterHead(cluster).E= N(a).E- Eprocess; 
        cluster= cluster+1; 
    else  
        ClusterMember(notcluster).xd=N(a).xd; 
        ClusterMember(notcluster).yd=N(a).yd; 
        ClusterMember(notcluster).index=a; 
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        ClusterMember(notcluster).E= N(a).E- Eprocess; 
        %Cost of Comparison to p 
        notcluster= notcluster+1; 
    end 
end 
  
%% Nodes become ClusterMembers or ClusterHeads (additional Iterations) 
  
% Join nodes join a Cluster, if that have not elected to be a cluster 
head 
% Must set a max distance (transmission range limit) 
maxdistance=40; 
  
% Distance matrix  
dismatrix= zeros(cluster-1, notcluster-1); 
for i=1:cluster-1 
    for j =1:notcluster-1 
        dismatrix(i,j)= sqrt((ClusterHead(i).xd-
ClusterMember(j).xd)^2+(ClusterHead(i).yd-ClusterMember(j).yd)^2); 
    end 
end 
  
% Costs for distance matrix 
for i=1:cluster-1 
    ClusterHead(i).E= ClusterHead(i).E- Eprocess.*(notcluster-1); 
end 
  
for j= 1:notcluster-1 
    ClusterMember(j).E=ClusterMember(j).E-Eprocess.*(cluster-1); 
end 
  
[nm, r] = min(dismatrix); 
  
NewClusterHead1= 0; 
% If in range elect to be in a Cluster, if not a portion become 
ClusterHeads. 
% Probablility for ClusterMembers out of Range to elect to become 




    if nm(i)<=maxdistance  
        % Don't actually have to do this, because you may reassign on 
2nd 
        % iteration but no harm in doing it. 
        ClusterMember(i).ch=r(i); 
        % Cost of Comparision 
        ClusterMember(i).E= ClusterMember(i).E- Eprocess; 
    else 
        ClusterMember(i).ch=rand(1,1); 
        % Cost of Rand # Gen 
        ClusterMember(i).E= ClusterMember(i).E- Eprocess; 
        % To handle sink node not becoming a ClusterHead 
        ClusterMember(1).ch= p2+.01; 
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        % For the Case where not all ClusterMembers out of Range Elect 
to 
        % become ClusterHeads 
        if ClusterMember(i).ch <p2 
            ClusterHead(CountCH+1).xd= ClusterMember(i).xd; 
            ClusterHead(CountCH+1).yd= ClusterMember(i).yd; 
            ClusterHead(CountCH+1).index= ClusterMember(i).index; 
            ClusterHead(CountCH+1).E= ClusterMember(i).E- Eprocess; 
            CountCH=CountCH+1; 
            NewClusterHead1= NewClusterHead1+1; 
        end 
    end 
end 
  
% To remove Self Elected ClusterHead from ClusterMember List 
for i=1:notcluster-1 






%Second Iteration of Associating Cluster Members to Clusterheads 
% Pre-allocate Matrix 
dismatrix2= zeros(CountCH, notcluster-1); 
  
% Compute Distance's 
for i=1:CountCH 
    for j =1:notcluster-1 
        dismatrix2(i,j)= sqrt((ClusterHead(i).xd-
ClusterMemberRd1(j).xd)^2+(ClusterHead(i).yd-
ClusterMemberRd1(j).yd)^2); 
    end 
end 
  
% Costs for distance matrix 
for i=1:CountCH 
    ClusterHead(i).E= ClusterHead(i).E- Eprocess.*(notcluster-1); 
end 
  
for j= 1:notcluster-1 




[nm, r] = min(dismatrix2); 
  
for i=1:notcluster-1 
    % Nodes within Range Become ClusterMembers 
    if nm(i)<=maxdistance %this is arbitrary 
        ClusterMemberRd1(i).ch=r(i); 
    % Nodes not within Rannge become ClusterHeads 
    else 
        ClusterHead(CountCH+1).xd= ClusterMemberRd1(i).xd; 
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        ClusterHead(CountCH+1).yd= ClusterMemberRd1(i).yd; 
        ClusterHead(CountCH+1).index= ClusterMemberRd1(i).index; 
        ClusterHead(CountCH+1).E= ClusterMemberRd1(i).E- Eprocess; 
        CountCH=CountCH+1; 
        NewClusterHead2= NewClusterHead2+1; 
    end 
end 
  










ClusterMemberRd2 = ClusterMemberRd1(r); 
  
% At this point network topoligy is complete. All nodes are placed and 
all 
% nodes are either Cluster Heads or Cluster Members 
  
%% Assign a reference number to each node 
start =1; 
for i=1:CountCH 
    ClusterHead(i).number= start; 





    ClusterMemberRd2(i).number=counter; 












    for j =1:CountCH 
        adjCH(i,j)= sqrt((ClusterHead(i).xd-
ClusterHead(j).xd)^2+(ClusterHead(i).yd-ClusterHead(j).yd)^2); 




%Reduce matrix to neighborbors within range 
for i=1:CountCH; 
    for j=1:CountCH; 
       if adjCH(i,j)> maxdistance; 
        adjCH(i,j)=0; 
       end 
    end 
end 
  
% Costs for adj matrix 
for i=1:CountCH 
    ClusterHead(i).E= ClusterHead(i).E- Eprocess.*(CountCH); 
end 
  
% Costs for Range Check 
for i=1:CountCH 




% CH_isotest % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
[S,C]= graphconncomp(sparse(adjCH), 'Weak', true); 
  
while S>1 
    % Reelect CH 
    SaveEnergyValues; 
    clear ClusterHead 
    ElectCH; 
    CHadj; 





% Dij % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  










while (sum(S) ~= n) 
    cand = []; 
    for (i=1:n) 
        if (S(i)==0) 
            cand = [cand distance(i)]; 
        else 
            cand =[cand inf]; 
        end 
    end 
     
    [x u] = min(cand); 
    S(u) =1; 
     
    for (i =1:n) 
        if (distance(u) + costs(u,i) < distance(i)) && (costs(u,i) ~=0) 
            distance(i) = distance(u) + costs(u,i); 
            previous(i) = u; 
        end 






ShortestPath = [dest]; 
traverse= dest; 
  
while (previous(traverse) ~=source) 
    ShortestPath = [ previous(traverse) ShortestPath]; 
    traverse = previous(traverse); 
end 
  
ShortestPath = [previous(traverse) ShortestPath]; 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 






    if i==a 
        ClusterHead(i).Rte= a; 
    else 
        ClusterHead(i).Rte= [Dij(adjCH,i,a)]; 




for i= 1:CountCH 
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    ClusterHead(i).E= ClusterHead(i).E- ((ETx+ Eprocess+ERx)*CountCH); 
end 
  
% Count # of Route that are 2 hop (Source and SNCH) 
for i=1: CountCH 




Three_hop_paths= sum (w==3); 












% Determine how many clustermembers each CH has 
for i= 1:length(ClusterMemberRd2) 




% Determine the Energy Value for each CH 
CHenergy= [ClusterHead.E]; 
  
% Sort CH by Energy and # of CM 
[sortedValuesMEM, sortedIndexMEM] = sort(CHmember_Ct(:), 'descend'); 







while totalMembers< threshold_for_am 
    BroadCastCH(i)= sortedIndexE(i); 
    totalMembers= totalMembers + CHmember_Ct(sortedIndexE(i)); 
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
% Add Sink Nodes CH if not already a member 
SNCHcheck= ismember(ClusterMemberRd2(1).ch, BroadCastCH); 
  
if SNCHcheck ==0 
    BroadCastCH= [BroadCastCH ClusterMemberRd2(1).ch]; 
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% SourceSim % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
% NOTE THIS IS A UNIFORM RANDOM DISTRO 
Source_Node= []; 
num_mess= 5000; 
for d=1:num_mess %Number of messages sent through network 




% Sim_Loop_2 % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 









for i= 1:num_mess 
    if (max(e_tally) < reset_energy & rds_ctr < reset_rds) 
       % Increment Counter 
        rds_ctr= rds_ctr +1; 
        % Route Traffic 
        % Source is not a CH 
        if ismember(Source_Node(i), CH_IndexMatrix) ==0 
            % Route From SN to CH/ decrement energy 
            indexCM(i)= find(CM_IndexMatrix== Source_Node(i),1); 
            ClusterMemberRd2(indexCM(i)).E=  
ClusterMemberRd2(indexCM(i)).E - Eprocess- ETx; 
            CH= ClusterMemberRd2(indexCM(i)).ch; 
            % Route From Source Node CH to Sink Node CH/ decrement 
energy 
            Rte= ClusterHead(CH).Rte; 
            for j=1:length(Rte) 
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                % Not a Broadcast CH 
                if ismember(Rte(j), BroadCastCH)== 0 
                    ClusterHead(Rte(j)).E= ClusterHead(Rte(j)).E- ERx- 
Eprocess- ETx; 
                    e_tally(Rte(j))= e_tally(Rte(j)) + ERx+ Eprocess+ 
ETx; 
                % Broadcast CH 
                else 
                    ClusterHead(Rte(j)).E= ClusterHead(Rte(j)).E- ERx- 
Eprocess- ETx*CHmember_Ct(Rte(j)); 
                    e_tally(Rte(j))= e_tally(Rte(j)) + ERx+ Eprocess+ 
ETx*CHmember_Ct(Rte(j)); 
                end 
            end 
        % Source is a CH  
        else 
            %Route from SN to Sink Node CH/ decrement energy 
            indexCH(i)= find(CH_IndexMatrix== Source_Node(i),1); 
            Rte= ClusterHead(indexCH(i)).Rte; 
            for k= 1:length(Rte) 
                %Not a Broadcast CH 
                if ismember(Rte(k), BroadCastCH)== 0 
                    ClusterHead(Rte(k)).E= ClusterHead(Rte(k)).E- ERx- 
Eprocess- ETx; 
                    e_tally(Rte(k))= e_tally(Rte(k)) + ERx+ Eprocess+ 
ETx; 
                % Broadcast CH 
                else 
                    ClusterHead(Rte(k)).E= ClusterHead(Rte(k)).E- ERx- 
Eprocess- ETx*CHmember_Ct(Rte(k)); 
                    e_tally(Rte(k))= e_tally(Rte(k)) + ERx+ Eprocess+ 
ETx*CHmember_Ct(Rte(k)); 
                end 
            end         
        end    
    else 
        % Return Counter to 1 (Not 0 because 1 message is routed here) 
         
        disp('**********') 
        rds_ctr=1; 
        % Rotate CH 
        SaveEnergyValues; 
        clear ClusterHead 
        ElectCH; 
        CHadj; 
        CH_isotest; 
        CH_Route; 
        CHmem= [ClusterMemberRd2.index]; 
        CHind= [ClusterHead.index] 
        SNCH= ClusterMemberRd2(1).ch 
        Choose_BroadcastCH 
        e_tally= zeros(1, CountCH); 
        CH_IndexMatrix= [ClusterHead.index]; 
        CM_IndexMatrix= [ClusterMemberRd2.index]; 
        % Route Traffic 
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        % Source is not a CH 
        if ismember(Source_Node(i), CH_IndexMatrix) ==0 
            % Route From SN to CH/ decrement energy 
            indexCM(i)= find(CM_IndexMatrix== Source_Node(i),1); 
            ClusterMemberRd2(indexCM(i)).E=  
ClusterMemberRd2(indexCM(i)).E - Eprocess- ETx; 
            CH= ClusterMemberRd2(indexCM(i)).ch; 
            % Route From Source Node CH to Sink Node CH/ decrement 
energy 
            Rte= ClusterHead(CH).Rte; 
            for j=1:length(Rte) 
                % Not a Broadcast CH 
                if ismember(Rte(j), BroadCastCH)== 0 
                    ClusterHead(Rte(j)).E= ClusterHead(Rte(j)).E- ERx- 
Eprocess- ETx; 
                    e_tally(Rte(j))= e_tally(Rte(j)) + ERx+ Eprocess+ 
ETx; 
                % Broadcast CH 
                else 
                    ClusterHead(Rte(j)).E= ClusterHead(Rte(j)).E- ERx- 
Eprocess- ETx*CHmember_Ct(Rte(j)); 
                    e_tally(Rte(j))= e_tally(Rte(j)) + ERx+ Eprocess+ 
ETx*CHmember_Ct(Rte(j)); 
                end 
            end 
        % Source is a CH  
        else 
            %Route from SN to Sink Node CH/ decrement energy 
            indexCH(i)= find(CH_IndexMatrix== Source_Node(i),1); 
            Rte= ClusterHead(indexCH(i)).Rte; 
            for k= 1:length(Rte) 
                %Not a Broadcast CH 
                if ismember(Rte(k), BroadCastCH)== 0 
                    ClusterHead(Rte(k)).E= ClusterHead(Rte(k)).E- ERx- 
Eprocess- ETx; 
                    e_tally(Rte(k))= e_tally(Rte(k)) + ERx+ Eprocess+ 
ETx; 
                % Broadcast CH 
                else 
                    ClusterHead(Rte(k)).E= ClusterHead(Rte(k)).E- ERx- 
Eprocess- ETx*CHmember_Ct(Rte(k)); 
                    e_tally(Rte(k))= e_tally(Rte(k)) + ERx+ Eprocess+ 
ETx*CHmember_Ct(Rte(k)); 
                end 
            end   
        end 







% Energy Metrics % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
% For Capturing Energy Consumption Data 
% Return Energy Values to "N" data structure 
SaveEnergyValues; 
% Create "Energy Used Vector" to Capture total energy spent by each 
member 
EnergyUsed(1)= 2-N(1).E; 
for i= 2:n 
    EnergyUsed(i)= Eo- N(i).E; 
end 
% Avg, Max and Min Energy Used by any node and it's index 
avg_EnergyUsed= mean(EnergyUsed) 
[max_EnergyUsed, index_max]= max(EnergyUsed) 
[min_EnergyUsed, index_min]= min(EnergyUsed) 
% Number of times Max and Min E Cost Values appear in Source Node 
Matrix 
occurs_inSN_max= length(find(Source_Node== index_max)) 
occurs_inSN_min= length(find(Source_Node== index_min)); 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Anonymity_Metrics % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
% For Capturing Anonymity Data 
% record_num_NodesBroadcast= []; 
% record_SNCH_members= []; 








% SaveEnergyValues % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
% Save Energy Values Back to Original 
  
for i= 1:CountCH 









% Plot Results % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  




    plot(N(a).xd, N(a).yd, 'go'); 
    %Allows you to see Sink Node 




axis([0 xmax 0 ymax]) 
xlabel('Sensor Coordinate X (meters)') 
ylabel('Sensor Coordinate Y (meters)') 
% title('Random Sensor Network with Deliberate Sink Node Placement')   
legend('Location', 'best', 'Nodes', 'Sink Node') 
  
% Plot new ClusterHeads 
% New ClusterHeads as Red + 
Iteration1= figure; 
hold on  
for a=1:n 
    plot(N(a).xd, N(a).yd, 'go'); 
    plot(N(1).xd, N(1).yd, 'b*'); 
    for i=1:CountCH-NewClusterHead1-NewClusterHead2 
        plot(ClusterHead(i).xd, ClusterHead(i).yd, 'r+') 
    end 
end 
  
    %Allows you to see Sink Node 
  
% for i=1:CountCH-NewClusterHead1-NewClusterHead2 
%     plot(ClusterHead(i).xd, ClusterHead(i).yd, 'r+') 
% end 
axis([0 xmax 0 ymax]) 
xlabel('Sensor Coordinate X (meters)') 
ylabel('Sensor Coordinate Y (meters)') 
%title('Random Sensor Network with Deliberate Sink Node Placement and 
Cluster Heads') 
legend('location', 'best', 'Node', 'Sink Node', 'Cluster Head') 
hold off 
  
% Plot new ClusterHeads  





    plot(N(a).xd, N(a).yd, 'go'); 
    %Allows you to see Sink Node 
    plot(N(1).xd, N(1).yd, 'b*'); 
    for i=1:CountCH-NewClusterHead1-NewClusterHead2 
        plot(ClusterHead(i).xd, ClusterHead(i).yd, 'r+') 
            for i=CountCH-NewClusterHead1-NewClusterHead2+1:CountCH-
NewClusterHead2 
                plot(ClusterHead(i).xd, ClusterHead(i).yd, 'kd') 
            end 





axis([0 xmax 0 ymax]) 
xlabel('Sensor Coordinate X (meters)') 
ylabel('Sensor Coordinate Y (meters)') 
%title('Random Sensor Network with Deliberate Sink Node Placement and 
Cluster Heads') 
legend('location', 'best', 'Nodes', 'Sink Node', 'Cluster Heads Rd 1', 
'Cluster Heads Rd 2') 
  
% Plot new ClusterHeads 
% New ClusterHeads Red Star 
Iteration3=figure; 
axis([0 xmax 0 ymax]) 
hold on 
for a=1:n 
    plot(N(a).xd, N(a).yd, 'go'); 
    %Allows you to see Sink Node 
    plot(N(1).xd, N(1).yd, 'b*'); 
    for i=1:CountCH-NewClusterHead1-NewClusterHead2 
        plot(ClusterHead(i).xd, ClusterHead(i).yd, 'r+') 
         for i=CountCH-NewClusterHead1-NewClusterHead2+1:CountCH-
NewClusterHead2 
             plot(ClusterHead(i).xd, ClusterHead(i).yd, 'kd') 
             for i=CountCH-NewClusterHead2+1:CountCH 
                 plot(ClusterHead(i).xd, ClusterHead(i).yd, 'rp') 
             end 
         end 




axis([0 xmax 0 ymax]) 
xlabel('Sensor Coordinate X') 
ylabel('Sensor Coordinate Y') 
title('Random Sensor Network with Deliberate Sink Node Placement and 
Cluster Heads') 
legend('location', 'best', 'Nodes', 'Sink Node', 'Cluster Heads Rd 1', 
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